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POST-TRIAL JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CRIMINAL
CONVICTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE
UNITED STATES AND FINLAND
Christopher M. Johnson*
In 2011, two murder cases involving defendants who professed their innocence
came to dramatic conclusions in appellate courts.1 In Finland in August 2011, the
murder prosecution of Anneli Auer ended2 with her acquittal by an appellate court.3
In the United States in September 2011, the murder prosecution of Troy Davis
ended with his execution in Georgia’s death chamber, despite exculpatory
information developed after his trial about the reliability of some eyewitness
identification evidence.4
The Finnish case arose out of the December 2006 death of Jukka Lahti in
Ulvila.5 His wife, Auer, called the police and claimed that an intruder entered their
house and attacked her husband.6 After an investigation, the police charged Auer,
accusing her of having staged the break-in.7 The Georgia case arose out of the
shooting death of Savannah police officer Mark MacPhail on August 19, 1989.8
The shooting happened shortly after midnight, near a bus station and Burger King
at which MacPhail worked as a security guard.9 A disturbance had begun outside a

* Professor of Law, University of New Hampshire School of Law, and Chief Appellate Defender,
New Hampshire Public Defender. J.D., Harvard University Law School, 1994; M.A.L.D., Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1994; B.A. Carleton College, 1989. I am much
indebted to Anna-Liisa Autio, Juha Lavapuro, Jussi Tapani, Mikko Vuorenpää and my other colleagues
during a Fulbright-supported semester in the Law Faculty at the University of Turku for their generous
help in introducing me to the Finnish criminal justice system, and to the many colleagues in the Public
Defender and at the University of New Hampshire School of Law who have aided in the preparation of
this article.
1. Actually, of course, more than two murder cases came to dramatic conclusions in appellate
courts in 2011. Perhaps the best-known case involved Amanda Knox, an American convicted of murder
in Italy, and acquitted in an appellate court in 2011. See NINA BURLEIGH, THE FATAL GIFT OF BEAUTY:
THE TRIALS OF AMANDA KNOX (2011).
2. Subject, however, to a prosecution appeal to a higher appellate court.
3. Prosecutors Still Investigating Anneli Auer Despite Initial Murder Acquittal, HELSINGIN
SANOMAT,
Aug.
26,
2011,
http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Prosecutors+still+investigating+
Anneli+Auer+despite+initial+murder+acquittal/1135268863652.
4. Colleen Curry & Michael S. James, Troy Davis Executed After Stay Denied by Supreme Court,
ABC NEWS, Sept. 21, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/US/troy-davis-executed-stay-denied-supremecourt/story?id=14571862. See also In re Davis, No. CV409-130, 2010 WL 3385081 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24,
2010) (describing facts of case), appeal dismissed 625 F.3d 716 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct.
1787 (2011).
5. Wife Found Guilty of Killing Her Husband in Long-Running Ulvila Homicide Case, HELSINGIN
SANomat,
June
23,
2010,
http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Wife+found+guilty+of+killing+
her+husband+in+long-running+Ulvila+homicide+case/1135258088101. A Finnish language story
about the case appears at http://www.iltalehti.fi/uutiset/2011062613861464_uu.shtml.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Davis v. State, 660 S.E.2d 354, 357 (Ga. 2008).
9. Id.
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pool hall, during which a man was beaten.10 MacPhail went to the scene in
response to a call for help, and there encountered several people, one of whom shot
him three times.11 The prosecution contended that Davis shot MacPhail. Davis
maintained his innocence, arguing that another person committed the crime.12
This article does not examine the facts of either case, and thus ventures no
opinion on Auer’s or Davis’s guilt. Depending on the evidence, one could
conclude that justice was served in both Finland and the United States, or in one
country but not the other, or in neither. Rather, this article compares the different
conceptions of post-trial judicial review of criminal convictions illustrated by the
two cases.
In Finland, the appellate process afforded Auer a de novo reconsideration of
the question of her guilt, without requiring a prior showing of procedural error in
the trial. In the United States, a federal district court did receive new evidence on
the issue of Davis’s guilt, acting under an extraordinary ruling from the United
States Supreme Court,13 but in doing so held Davis to a high burden of proof with
respect to his innocence.14 In the United States, a principle of deference to the trial
jury’s judgment as to the facts operates to prevent any subsequent reviewing court
from undertaking a de novo re-examination of the case against Davis. In the
United States, a truly de novo inquiry into his guilt would occur only at a second
trial, and an American appellate court would order such a trial only upon finding
some defect in the first trial.
Observers have noted the “relative lack of scholarly attention paid to the
institutional role of appellate courts in the criminal context.”15 Comparative studies
of criminal appellate procedure are “virtually non-existent.”16 In an effort to
contribute to closing that gap in the scholarship, this article undertakes a
comparative investigation of the Finnish and American systems of post-trial
judicial review of criminal convictions. By means of that comparison, the article
seeks to understand the underlying assumptions and practical implications of two
differing conceptions of the role of the post-trial juridical review of criminal
convictions. The task of comparative description is facilitated by the fact that, to a
significant extent, information about the Finnish legal system is available in the
English language.17
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Curry & James, supra note 4.
13. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009).
14. In re Davis, No. CV409-130, 2010 WL 3385081 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2010) (describing facts of
case), appeal dismissed 625 F.3d 716 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 1787 (2011).
15. Chad M. Oldfather & Michael M. O’Hear, Criminal Appeals: Past, Present, and Future, 93
MARQ. L. REV. 339, 339 (2009).
16. Peter D. Marshall, A Comparative Analysis of the Right to Appeal, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L.
1, 2 (2011).
17. An excellent database for Finnish statutory and case law is Finlex, available at
http://www.finlex.fi/en/. English (and other foreign language) translations of many important statutes
are available, and the site links to Finnish case law, although decisions are reported only in Finnish and
Swedish on that site. A collection of English-language abstracts of selected Finnish appellate opinions
is available in the Dombase database administered by the Institute for Human Rights:
http://trip.abo.fi/aadb/dombase/dombaseen.htm. Citations to Finnish judicial opinion abbreviate the
name of the court and give numbers indicating the year and docket number of the case. The
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Before turning to that task, it is necessary to define some terms and note some
limitations of the argument. The article focuses on post-trial judicial review of
criminal convictions. Except to the extent necessary to the description and
comparison of the two systems of post-trial judicial review, the article thus does not
examine other important aspects of Finland’s and America’s criminal adjudication
systems. It does not examine the trial processes that produce a criminal conviction
in the first instance. Important differences distinguish trial procedures in the two
countries, but a detailed analysis of those difference falls outside the scope of the
present article.
Also, the article does not examine post-trial, non-judicial forms of review of a
criminal conviction. In the United States, an officer or agency typically housed in
the executive branch of government has authority to pardon or grant clemency to
convicted persons.18 In Finland, the President holds the pardon power.19 Such
extra-judicial forms of review of criminal convictions warrant comparative
attention, but this article leaves that task for another day.
The phrase, “post-trial judicial review,” also requires some explanation, as it is
not in common use in either country to denote any phase of the review of a criminal
conviction. American law divides what this article refers to collectively as “posttrial judicial review” into three phases for state prisoners (direct appeal, state postconviction review or collateral attack, and federal habeas corpus), and two phases
for federal prisoners (direct appeal and habeas corpus). One cannot, with complete
fidelity to the American distinction between trial and appellate courts, call the
collective “appellate review,” because aspects of the review involve hearings in
trial-level courts. Also, the latter two phases often take the form of a new lawsuit
challenging the prisoner’s continued confinement, rather than an appeal of the prior
conviction. Finnish law also has three phases of judicial review: an initial appeal
through the hierarchy of courts; an “extraordinary review” that begins either in the
intermediate court of appeals or the Supreme Court; and under some circumstances,
review in an international court.
Part I examines that architecture of the appellate process—the sequence and
hierarchy of the courts engaged in the post-trial judicial review of a conviction. In
that regard, Finland and the United States share some notable similarities. In one
significant respect, though, the architecture of judicial review differs in the two
countries. Because of the country’s federal structure, American post-trial judicial
review of state prisoner convictions can involve the presentation of the same claim
abbreviations are as follows: “KKO” refers to the Finnish Supreme Court, the korkein oikeus; “I-SHO”
refers to the Itä-Suomen Hovioikeus, or Eastern Finland Court of Appeals; “HelHO” refers to the
Helsinki Court of Appeals; “RHO” refers to the Rovaniemi Court of Appeals; “KouHO” refers to the
Kouvola Court of Appeals; “VaaHO” refers to the Vaasa Court of Appeals.
18. A number of articles discuss aspects of an executive pardon power. See, e.g., Kristen H.
Fowler, Limiting the Federal Pardon Power, 83 IND. L.J. 1651 (2008); Harold J. Krent, Conditioning
the President’s Conditional Pardon Power, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1665 (2001); Lauren Schorr, Breaking
into the Pardon Power: Congress and the Office of the Pardon Attorney, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1535
(2009);; Note, Executive Revision of Judicial Decisions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 2020 (1996).
19. The pardon power has recently come under review in Finland.
Niinistö willing to abolish presidential pardon for criminals, HELSINGIN SANOMAT, Feb. 20, 2011,
http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Niinist%C3%B6+willing+to+abolish+presidential+pardon+for+criminal
s/1135270069867.
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in both state and federal courts. Lacking a federal structure of government, Finland
does not make available two different sets of courts for the review of criminal
convictions. However, because of its status as a signatory to the European
Convention on Human Rights, prisoners challenging their Finnish criminal
convictions on the grounds of a violation of the Convention can take the case to a
separate judicial authority, the European Court of Human Rights. Also, because of
Finland’s membership in the European Union, a Finnish prisoner can, under some
circumstances as described below, challenge a conviction in the European Court of
Justice.
Part II examines the history of post-trial judicial review of criminal convictions
in each country. Finland’s criminal justice system has been much influenced by the
continental civil law tradition. America’s, of course, developed in the common law
tradition. The right to appeal a criminal conviction arose at different times in each
tradition, in response to different impulses.20 The origin and timing of the
development of the right to appeal in the United States led to a conception of
appeal as limited by the prerogatives of the jury. No such parallel development
occurred in Finland. That fact marks a second significant distinction between the
conceptions of appeal in the two countries.
Part III explores the nature of the inquiry undertaken in post-trial judicial
review of criminal convictions in the two countries. The article divides that Part
into sub-parts by reference to two broad decisional strategies available to reviewing
courts: assessing or avoiding the merits of the prisoner’s claim.
In Finland, a principal ground for appeal is that the conviction is substantively
unjust, in that the prosecution failed to demonstrate the defendant’s guilt. In the
United States, defects in trial structure or procedure commonly form the basis for
post-trial judicial review, with challenges to the substantive justice of the
conviction figuring less prominently. In both countries, exceptions exist; certain
procedural issues can form the basis for a Finnish challenge to a conviction, and
American prisoners can seek relief on substantive grounds. However, in Finland,
the scope for procedurally-based appeals is relatively narrow, and in the United
States, claims focusing directly on the adequacy of the proof of guilt are subject to
conditions that prevent post-trial judicial review from undertaking a de novo
reconsideration of guilt. That difference in the focus of post-trial judicial review
constitutes a significant distinction between the conceptions of appeal in the two
countries.
The second section of Part III examines non-merits-based grounds for
resolving criminal appeals. In the United States, waiver doctrines proliferate and,
when applicable, have the effect of allowing a conviction to be affirmed without
regard either to the substantive justice of the conviction or the procedural regularity
of the trial. In Finland, some waiver doctrines exist, but they are considerably less
prevalent than in the United States. That difference constitutes another significant
distinction between the conceptions of appeal in the two countries.
Part IV concludes the article by examining the collective significance of such
distinctions. What does the comparison reveal about American priorities and goals

20. See Marshall, supra note 16, at 4-14 (describing the history).
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vis-à-vis criminal adjudication? What does the comparison reveal about Finnish
goals and priorities? In 1939, Roscoe Pound wrote that:
It would seem that where life or liberty is at stake, as in a criminal
prosecution, a rational re-examination of the whole case after trial, at least
at the instance of a convicted accused, to be made by a tribunal insuring
the best judicial power in the jurisdiction, in order to insure that justice has
been done, would be a matter of course. . . . In the English-speaking
world we have been slow in coming to the conception of review of a
conviction suggested above, and in the United States we have still much
of the way to go. In our traditional legal system we have hardly become
aware of the end, although the public often assumes that review and
affirmance by an appellate tribunal is an assurance that the merits of a
conviction have been passed upon and that guilt of the accused has been
established by the judgment of the highest court.21
By means of comparative analysis, this article seeks to discern how much farther
we have come in the seven decades since Pound wrote those words.
Ultimately, the article proposes that the Finnish system manifests a relatively
greater trust than the American system in the decisional expertise of the judges
entrusted with the power of appellate review of criminal convictions. The
American system, by contrast, seeks to preserve the privileged position of the jury.
It embodies a relatively greater trust in the decisional expertise of that trial court
fact-finder and a correlatively greater suspicion about the appellate courts. Second,
the Finnish system of post-trial judicial review of criminal convictions manifests a
more single-minded pursuit of the goal of achieving an accurate verdict, as
measured by its reflection of the truth of the facts underlying the accusation. While
the American system unquestionably values accurate verdicts, it also pursues other
goals to the extent of compromising the pursuit of factual truth. These include, to a
greater extent that the Finnish system, the goals of preserving public confidence in
the criminal adjudication system and controlling that system’s costs.
I. THE ARCHITECTURE OF POST-TRIAL JUDICIAL REVIEW
When completely invoked by a defendant convicted, like Davis, in a state
court, the American system of post-trial judicial review involves at least two trips
through the hierarchy of state trial and appellate-level courts with the opportunity,
at the end of each trip, to seek review by the United States Supreme Court.22 The
first trip, the “direct appeal,” involves the presentation of issues raised before or
during trial, or in some instances, at a post-trial but pre-direct appeal motion for a
new trial. The second trip, “state post-conviction review,” typically involves the
presentation of claims not already litigated in the direct appeal process. Finally,
and usually after both direct appeal and state post-conviction review, the state
prisoner may, by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursue an appeal
through the hierarchy of federal courts. For defendants convicted in federal court,
21. Roscoe Pound, Introduction to LESTER B. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA 3 (1939).
22. The qualification “at least” reflects the fact that some convicted defendants file more than one
state post-conviction petition and/or more than one federal habeas petition. Such repeat petitions are
referred to as “successive” petitions.
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the opportunities for post-trial judicial review include two trips through the federal
courts, the first on direct appeal, and the second in habeas corpus.
If, in any phase of post-trial judicial review, the prisoner prevails, the
conviction is vacated. In some relatively rare instances, the nature of the prisoner’s
successful claim bars the prosecution from bringing the charge again in a second
trial.23 On other occasions, the prosecutor could retry the case, but chooses not to.
Probably most often, successful appeals are followed by reprosecution on the same
charge. In the event of conviction after a second trial, the reconvicted prisoner may
pursue a second appeal through all the same channels.
In its basic structure, the Finnish system of post-trial judicial review will not
strike an American lawyer as markedly unfamiliar. Criminal prosecutions begin in
a trial court.24 Both the State and the defendant have the right to appeal the trial
court judgment to an intermediate court of appeal.25 The Finnish Supreme Court
has discretion to determine which cases it hears on appeal.26 Because of its
structural similarity to American direct appeal, this article will refer to that first
phase of Finnish post-trial judicial review as the Finnish direct appeal.
Also, like the United States, Finland provides for judicial review of criminal
convictions after the end of that direct appeal.27 Under that provision, a convicted
person, who has become aware of perjury affecting the case or of new evidence
tending to show the person’s innocence, may file a petition in the intermediate
court of appeal or Supreme Court seeking the reversal of the conviction.28 At the
hearing on such a petition, the petitioner may seek to present new information.29 If
the court finds the petitioner’s claim to have merit, the court may either order a
retrial or enter judgment for the prisoner without a retrial.30 Using the English
label assigned by the translators of the relevant Finnish statute, this article refers to
that phase of Finnish post-trial judicial review as “extraordinary review.”
While Finland does not operate separate state and federal criminal courts,
Finnish convictions can, under some circumstances, be reviewed in an international
court, either the European Court of Human Rights or the European Court of
Justice.31 Although from time to time American convictions come before

23. A finding that the prosecution introduced insufficient evidence of guilt or violated the guarantee
of a speedy trial, for example, would preclude re-trial.
24. 7/1734 Oikeudenkäymiskaari, ch. 1, § 1 (2011) [hereinafter Code of Judicial Procedure]. The
English translation is available at http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1734/en17340004.pdf and the
Finnish at: http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/ajantasa/1734/17340004000. In the English translation, the trial
court is referred to as the district court; in Finnish, the trial court is the käräjäoikeus.
25. Code of Judicial Procedure, supra note 24, ch. 25, § 1. In Finnish, the intermediate court of
appeal is called hovioikeus.
26. Id. ch. 30, §§ 1, 2(1). In Finnish, the Supreme Court is called korkein oikeus.
27. Id. ch. 31.
28. Id. ch. 31, §§ 2(1), 5, 8. For cases invoking this procedure, see, for example, KKO 2009:84 and
KKO 2008:24.
29. Code of Judicial Procedure, supra note 24, ch. 31, § 5.
30. Id. ch. 31, §§ 6, 14. See also, e.g., KKO 2009:84 (noting that the court of appeal held oral
hearing, reassessed the evidence, and entered conviction, thereby altering the trial court’s judgment of
acquittal).
31. See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
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international courts,32 such appeals do not now form a regular part of American
post-conviction review, and the decisions of international courts are not generally
regarded as enforceable by American courts.33
In Finland and in the United States, choices about the architecture of post-trial
judicial review reflect two principal concerns: the first relating to the fundamental
purpose of post-trial judicial review, and the second relating to functional and
structural constraints on the courts responsible for conducting post-trial judicial
review. First, in both countries, post-trial judicial review aims to ensure that lower
courts reliably find facts and faithfully and consistently apply the governing law.
The architecture of post-trial judicial review serves that goal by providing the
oversight sufficient to hold trial courts accountable for their decisions. Second,
both countries have specific understandings about the functions properly performed
by the various courts engaged in post-trial judicial review. Those understandings
bear on the architecture of post-trial judicial review. In the United States, for
example, the capacity to receive evidence is allocated exclusively to trial-level
courts, while in Finland, appellate courts also have that capacity. Also, concepts of
the proper jurisdiction of courts can influence the architecture, as manifested for
example in the decisional specialization associated with federalism. This article
thus organizes its comparison of the architecture by reference to those two features.
A. The Goal of Review: Accountability Through Judicial Hierarchy
Within the Finnish direct appeal, the trial court—appeals court—Supreme
Court sequence of review reflects a simple hierarchy of authority. Review in the
intermediate court of appeal affords a forum in which the judgment of the trial
court can be reviewed. Discretionary review in the Supreme Court affords the legal
system an option for correction of error in the appeals court. In granting the power
of discretionary review to the highest court, Finnish law allows that highest court of
appeal to concentrate on cases of great or general importance. The American
system features the same hierarchy of authority, responsive to the same concern to
enable multiple opportunities for review, without requiring the judicial system to
accept for full review every case at every level of court.
Two justifications could be advanced for the multiple opportunities for review
implicit in the creation of an appellate court hierarchy. First, one could argue that
the cumulative process enriches the analysis such that, by the time the case reaches
the higher courts, the prior work of lower courts improves the quality of the later
courts’ decisions. At times, the United States Supreme Court has vouched for that
benefit of repetitive review.34
Second, one might argue that higher courts make better decisions than lower
courts, for reasons relating to their staffing or workload. For example, the process

32. See, e.g., Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31); LaGrand
Case (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27).
33. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 516 (2008) (“[N]either Medellin nor his amici have
identified a single nation that treats ICJ judgments as binding in domestic courts.”).
34. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 399 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Premature
resolution of the novel question presented has stunted the natural growth and refinement of alternative
principles.”).
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of collective decision-making characteristic of appellate courts may produce better
decisions than can be made by a single trial judge.35 Also, insofar as higher courts
decide fewer cases than lower courts, higher court judges may have more time to
spend per case. Associated with that greater capacity for focus is the fact that
higher courts also tend to have to decide a smaller number of disputed issues per
case than do lower courts, insofar as not every decision made by a trial judge is
appealed, and not every ruling of an intermediate court of appeal is accepted for
review by the highest, discretionary review courts.
Some of these latter considerations seem less applicable to Finland than to the
United States. The process of collective decision-making takes place in Finnish
trial courts on questions of law, insofar as lay and professional judges deliberate
together on all issues, including legal issues.36 Moreover, in some cases, multiple
professional judges preside together at a trial.37 American trial courts, via juries,
engage in collective decision-making on issues of fact, but juries do not decide
issues of law and the concept of having multiple judges preside together on a trial
is foreign to modern American practice.38
In both countries, one also finds evidence of the belief that higher courts make
better decisions even when not preceded and informed by a lower court
examination of the case. In the United States, for example, some states provide
that certain cases will proceed directly from a trial court to the state Supreme
Court, thereby bypassing the intermediate court of appeals.39 In Finland, a prisoner
who petitions for extraordinary review after direct appeal files that petition not in
the trial court, but in the appeals court or Supreme Court.40
In one respect, the Finnish system of hierarchical review constrains trial courts
in their fact-finding capacity more than does the American system. At the
conclusion of a Finnish criminal trial, the fact-finder must explain in writing the
reasoning supporting the verdict.41 An American jury has no such obligation, but
rather merely announces the verdict. Indeed, by various devices American law
seeks to protect jury verdicts from challenges on the grounds of incoherence.42 The
35. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 16, at 29, 31 (citing references from South Africa and New
Zealand attesting to the value of collective decision-making processes).
36. 689/1997 Laki oikeudenkäynnistä rikosasioissa, ch. 10, § 4 (2002) [hereinafter Criminal
Procedure Act], available at http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1997/en19970689.pdf (English
translation).
37. Code of Judicial Procedure, supra note 24, ch. 2, § 1.
38. It has not always been this way. In some early trials, more than one professional judge presided.
See, e.g., Stephen B. Presser, A Tale of Two Judges: Richard Peters, Samuel Chase, and the Broken
Promise of Federalist Jurisprudence, 73 NW. U. L. REV. 26, 83-88 (1978) (discussing trial brought on
charges arising from the “Fries Rebellion” in Eastern Pennsylvania, over which presided two judges).
The practice of using multiple judges at certain American trials survived in places into the twentieth
century. See, e.g., IRVING MORRIS, THE RAPE CASE: A YOUNG LAWYER’S STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE IN
THE 1950’S, at 35 (2011) (noting that three judges presided on capital trials in Delaware as late as the
1940’s).
39. See, e.g., Cecilia Rasmussen, Oversight Led to Automatic Appeals in Death Row Cases, L.A.
TIMES (June 17, 2007), http://articles.latimes.com/2007/jun/17/local/me-then17.
40. Code of Judicial Procedure, supra note 24, ch. 31, §§ 2, 12, 14a.
41. Id. ch. 21, § 3(1); Criminal Procedure Act, supra note 36, ch. 11, § 4(1).
42. One such rule obliges appellate courts to affirm inconsistent verdicts. See generally Eric L.
Muller, The Hobgoblin of Little Minds? Our Foolish Law of Inconsistent Verdicts, 111 HARV. L. REV.
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absence of an explanation for the verdict leaves post-trial reviewing courts in the
position of deferring to a verdict if any rational jury could have reached it.43 It
matters not whether the actual jury, in reaching the verdict, followed a logical line
of reasoning.
B. Functional Specialization: Evidence and Federalism
The architecture of post-trial judicial review can also reflect concepts of
courts’ functional specialization. This article notes two kinds of functional
specialization. The first involves the competence to take evidence, and the second
involves federalism and its implications for courts’ competence to decide different
kinds of legal issues. In respect both to evidence and federalism, one finds in
Finland less functional specialization within post-trial judicial review than one
finds in the United States.
1. Evidence
In Finland, the trial court does not have a monopoly on the authority to receive
evidence. Rather, litigants can present evidence, at least in the discretion of the
court, in both the intermediate court of appeals and in the Supreme Court.44
Moreover, in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, the parties are not limited to representing on appeal the same evidence presented in the trial court; rather, new
evidence may also be presented on appeal.45
In 2010, evidently in an effort to conserve the resources of the court of
appeals, the Finnish parliament passed a statute empowering the court of appeals
more often to forego the oral evidentiary hearing.46 For example, as of January 1,
2011, a person sentenced to four months or less of imprisonment must apply to the
court of appeals for permission to appeal.47 The new law does not, however,
change the fact that, when it hears evidence on appeal, the court of appeals decides
the case de novo.
By contrast, the American system differentiates by function among the courts
engaged in post-trial judicial review of criminal convictions. Perhaps the most
notable instance involves the rule restricting the presentation of evidence to trial-

771 (1998). Another bars post-trial reviewing courts from admitting juror testimony for the purpose of
impeaching a verdict. See generally Benjamin T. Huebner, Beyond Tanner: An Alternative Framework
for Postverdict Juror Testimony, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1469 (2006).
43. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
44. Code of Judicial Procedure, supra note 24, ch. 24, § 15(1). Until recently, a Finnish appellate
court generally had to hold an oral hearing when the prisoner so requested. See KKO 2000:62. An
appellate court need not hold an oral hearing, though, if the appellant raises only a legal claim, see
VaaHO 1996:4, or if such a hearing is clearly unnecessary, see KKO 2002:15. Under a recent statute
not yet translated into English, the appeals court has greater authority than formerly to decline to hold an
evidentiary hearing. See 650/2010 Laki oikeudenkäymiskaaren muuttamisesta, ch. 25a, available at
http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/alkup/2010/20100650.
45. Code of Judicial Procedure, supra note 24, ch. 25, § 17 (prohibiting introduction of new
evidence in civil cases only, unless the proponent can show cause for failure to present the evidence in
the trial court).
46. See 650/2010 Laki oikeudenkäymiskaaren muuttamisesta, ch. 25a.
47. Id. § 6.
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level courts, to the exclusion of appellate courts. Because only trial-level courts
receive evidence, their fact-findings are treated with deference by appellate courts,
in the sense of being deemed correct unless clearly erroneous.48 Trial courts have
no exclusive prerogative with respect to questions of law, and so appellate courts
do not examine trial court legal rulings subject to any deferential standard of
review.49
In some states, in the case of minor crimes, a defendant has the opportunity
first to have a bench trial in a misdemeanor court.50 Upon conviction in that court,
the defendant often can appeal the case to a trial de novo before a jury in a higher
court. While such provisions allow for the de novo reconsideration of the question
of guilt, they exist only in the case of relatively minor crimes, and the appeal takes
the case from a judge to a jury. In the case of more serious crimes, where by virtue
of the case’s beginning in a jury court the appeal would take the case from a jury to
a judge, no opportunity for de novo review exists. The United States is not unique
in this quality of offering a de novo appeal to a second trial only in the case of
minor crimes,51 but it is revealing that the opportunity for de novo appeal of fact
should be reserved for circumstances in which a jury is the reviewing body.
In Finland, because appellate courts can receive evidence, appellate review of
the factual issues raised on appeal is de novo.52 That is, the Finnish appellate
courts need not defer to trial court judgments on identical issues. However, in
practice, a certain kind of deference may exist. Because of the passage of time
between trial and appeal, it can happen that the quality of the evidence degrades by
the time of the appellate court’s hearing. However, even when the court of appeals
affirms the decision of the trial court, quite often appeals court judges feel that the
hearing in the appeals court has been useful, because it has made the case more
clear.53
Nothing about the American system necessarily requires a functional
differentiation between trial and appellate level courts in regards to the receipt or
consideration of evidence.54 Although the Constitution guarantees the right to trial
by jury, that guarantee does not preclude the empowerment of appellate courts to

48. See, e.g., Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 369 (1991).
49. See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696-97 (1996). For a trenchant criticism of the
extent to which appellate courts now defer to trial court fact-finding, see Chad M. Oldfather, Appellate
Courts, Historical Facts, and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 57 VAND. L. REV. 437 (2004).
50. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 599:1 (2011).
51. Although it lacks juries, Egypt otherwise seems to share the feature of allowing a de novo
appeal to a higher trial court only in cases involving minor charges. See Sadiq Reza, Egypt, in
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 133, 144 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2009).
52. Code of Judicial Procedure, supra note 24, ch. 24, §§ 15-16 (describing decisional procedure of
court of appeals, without reference to any principle of deference to the trial court); Id. § 19 (providing
that except as otherwise specified, the provisions governing a decision in trial court apply also in court
of appeals); Id. ch. 26 (governing procedure for hearing case in court of appeals; in particular section
15).
53. I am indebted to Anna-Liisa Autio, who has worked as a refendary in the Turku Court of
Appeals, for this observation.
54. Oldfather, supra note 49, at 470 (noting prevalence in 1930’s of proposals for appellate review
of facts underlying convictions).
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review factual findings.55 Moreover, scholars have argued that appellate courts
have the competence to engage in a high-quality review of factual determinations
made by juries.56
In the 1930’s, “proposals for appellate review of the facts underlying
convictions were prevalent.”57 At that time, the case of Sacco and Vanzetti had
focused national and international attention on the risk of fact-finding error in
American criminal prosecutions.58 Under present circumstances, a reform allowing
American appellate courts to receive evidence seems inconceivable, if only because
the American judicial system is understood to be struggling to cope with its
caseload, and any proposal that could substantially increase the amount of time
devoted to a large number of cases will be seen as impossible to implement in
practice.59 However, scholars have made renewed calls for less deferential
appellate review of jury fact-finding.60
A few conclusions emerge. First, it would seem impossible in practice for the
American system to abandon its exclusive assignment to trial courts of the capacity
to receive evidence. That functional specialization may or may not be a virtue, but
it is certainly a necessity under present American conditions. The blunt reality of
costs here constrains the American system more than the Finnish.
Second, the evidentiary exclusivity of trial courts encourages American
appellate courts to defer to trial court findings of fact. Professor Oldfather and
others have persuasively argued that appellate courts have the capacity to review
trial court findings of fact with skill and insight.61 In some respects, appellate
courts have tools that potentially make them superior to jurors as fact-finders,
including written transcripts and the experience of involvement in many cases. The
fact that American appellate courts afford much less deference to jury fact-finding
in civil cases demonstrates that, at some level, American appellate courts believe in
their fact-finding competence.62 Nevertheless, as discussed in further detail below,
post-trial judicial review in America is characterized by the substantial deference
afforded by post-trial reviewing courts to trial court fact-finding. American
appeals, therefore, operate under a constraint with regard to fact finding that
Finnish appeals avoid. Depending on one’s view of whether appellate courts, if
permitted freer review, will create or correct more errors, deference would improve
or impair the capacity of post-trial judicial review to ensure that justice is done in
individual cases.63

55. For an argument defending the constitutionality of de novo appellate review of facts, see Keith
A. Findley, Innocence Protection in the Appellate Process, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 591, 619 (2009).
56. Oldfather, supra note 49, at 470.
57. Id.
58. For an excellent recent review of the case, see BRUCE WATSON, SACCO & VANZETTI: THE MEN,
THE MURDERS, AND THE JUDGMENT OF MANKIND (2007).
59. Oldfather, supra note 49, at 470-71.
60. Findley, supra note 55, at 618-23.
61. Oldfather, supra note 49. See also generally Findley, supra note 55.
62. Oldfather, supra note 49, at 494-502.
63. Id. at 483-84.
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2. Federalism.
A second form of functional specialization of the courts engaged in post-trial
judicial review involves not the review of factual findings, but rather the review of
legal conclusions. Finland is not a federal republic, and it operates a unified system
of criminal courts, applying a unified body of criminal law.64 By contrast, the
United States operates coordinate criminal justice systems, with each state and the
federal government defining and enforcing its own criminal laws. Because the
United States Constitution imposes a variety of restrictions on the states in regards
to criminal law and procedure, in the case of persons prosecuted under state
authority, two bodies of law apply. Because both state law and federal
constitutional law apply in such cases, their post-trial judicial review can reach
both state and federal courts.
In the United States, state courts must apply not only controlling principles of
state law, but also controlling principles of federal constitutional law. Federal
habeas courts have narrower jurisdiction, in the sense that they have no authority,
in the context of the review of state criminal convictions, to decide a prisoner’s
state law claims.65 Their jurisdiction, rather, extends only to federal law claims.66
Moreover, even with regard to federal law claims, the federal habeas courts can
review such claims only if the state prisoner has first presented them in the state
courts.67
Further substantive restrictions on federal habeas review exist. Federal habeas
courts are barred from adjudicating certain kinds of claims of violation of federal
constitutional rights. In Stone v. Powell,68 the Supreme Court held that federal
habeas courts cannot adjudicate claims of violation of the Fourth Amendment if the
prisoner had a “full and fair” opportunity to litigate the claim in the state courts.69
In so ruling, the Court focused on the “judicially created” nature of the
exclusionary rule.70 Through use of the exclusionary rule, courts have sought to
promote police compliance with the Fourth Amendment’s search and seizure
regulations by excluding from criminal trials evidence obtained in violation of
those regulations.71
The use of the exclusionary rule as a mechanism for promoting police
compliance with search and arrest regulations constitutes a characteristic feature of
American criminal adjudication.72 The exclusionary rule has its critics,73 and their

64. See 39/1889 Rikoslaki (2008) [hereinafter Criminal Code of Finland], available at
http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1889/en18890039.pdf (English translation).
65. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991).
66. Id. at 68.
67. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982).
68. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
69. Id. at 481-82.
70. Id. at 482.
71. Id. at 486 (“The primary justification for the exclusionary rule then is the deterrence of police
conduct that violates Fourth Amendment rights.”).
72. It is not, though, unique to the United States. Some other countries employ an exclusionary rule
to varying extents for a similar purpose. See, e.g., Binyamin Blum, Doctrines Without Borders: The
“New” Israeli Exclusionary Rule and the Dangers of Legal Transplantation, 60 STAN. L. REV. 2131
(2008); Craig M. Bradley, The Exclusionary Rule in Germany, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1032 (1983); Margaret
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most fundamental point is that the exclusionary rule deprives courts of reliable
evidence tending to prove a defendant’s guilt. In Justice Cardozo’s famous
formulation, the exclusionary rule suffers the defect that the criminal “may go free
because the constable has blundered.”74
Finland does not use an exclusionary rule as the standard remedy for violations
by the police of the rules governing criminal investigation.75 The rules regulating
police investigation are largely statutory, and they describe with some specificity
the boundaries of proper police practice.76 In cases of extreme misconduct by the
police, Finnish courts have remedies available that could include the exclusion of
evidence.77 More typically, though, the remedy for police misconduct would
involve individual discipline of the police officer. For example, in one case,
persons arrested by a police officer for theft brought a private prosecution against
the officer, on the ground that he had violated his official obligations by calling
them “thieves” during the arrest.78 Although the Finnish courts found the
dereliction petty and thus acquitted the officer, a dissenting judge in the court of
appeals would have upheld a fine imposed on the officer “mainly because [he] had
continued to call [them] ‘thieves’” after the arrival at the scene of the arrest of
supporting officers, and thus after the situation had calmed down.79
In the United States, federal court review of the constitutionality of state
convictions serves to ensure that state courts grant due respect to the prisoner’s
federal rights. The existence of federal review thus manifests a concern that, in the
absence of such review, state courts would not vindicate federal rights. By virtue
of ruling last on such issues, federal courts have a superior, reviewing role over the
decisions of state courts on questions of federal law.
In recent years, however, there has arisen in some quarters a lack of confidence
in the regulatory performance of federal habeas courts. A sense that federal habeas
K. Lewis, Controlling Abuse to Maintain Control: The Exclusionary Rule in China, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT’L
L. & POL. 629 (2011).
73. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Starr & Audrey L. Maness, Reasonable Remedies and (or?) the
Exclusionary Rule, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 373 (2010).
74. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926). The truth of the sense of that pithy epigram is
contested. In his dissent in United States v. Leon, Justice Brennan described it as “misleading,” as it is
the obligation of compliance with the Fourth Amendment, rather than the exclusionary rule, that “makes
it more difficult to catch criminals.” 468 U.S. 897, 941 (1984).
75. See KKO 2007:58 (holding that the fact that evidence has been obtained by illegal means does
not necessarily mean that it is inadmissible; however, evidence which has been obtained in serious
violation of the law may be excluded on a case-by-case basis); KouHO 2004:5 (Sept. 23, 2004)
(discussing admissibility of unlawfully obtained information; holding that court may on a case-by-case
basis consider the admissibility of such evidence, taking into account the values and goals protected by
declaring the evidence inadmissible, the requirements of a fair trial, the significance of the evidence as
well as the pursuit of finding out the substantive truth).
76. See 449/1987 Esitutkintalaki [hereinafter Criminal Investigations Act]. A no-longer-current
English translation is on file with the author, and available by e-mail from the Finnish Ministry of
Justice. See http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1987/en19870449. The current Finnish version is
available at http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/ajantasa/1987/19870449.
77. See I-SHO 2005:24 (adjudicating private criminal prosecution brought by arrested persons
against arresting officer).
78. Id. (describing an effort initiated by a private person to criminally prosecute a police officer for
the officer’s behavior during the arrest).
79. Id.
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courts too often or too easily have overturned state court convictions led to the
passage, in 1996, of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA).80 Under that act, a federal court can only grant habeas relief on a claim
rejected by the state courts if the state court adjudication “resulted in a decision that
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”81
One can therefore understand the standards governing federal habeas review of
state convictions as reflecting the prevalent sense of the location of the greatest risk
of erroneous appellate judgments. The existence of federal habeas review reflects
the concern that state courts will not, in the absence of federal court review,
vindicate state prisoners’ legitimate claims of violation of federal rights. The
current deferential standard of review reflects the concern that federal courts, if
entrusted with the power of de novo review of federal constitutional claims, will
too frequently and improperly overturn state convictions on federal law grounds.
Although not a federal republic, Finland has, by treaty, embarked on a kind of
criminal justice federalism by joining international organizations that operate
courts having some jurisdiction to decide cases arising out of Finnish convictions.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is a creature of the European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).82 The
European Court of Justice (ECJ) is an agency of the European Union (EU).
The ECHR obligates member states, including Finland, to respect and protect a
broad range of rights, such as the freedom of speech and religion.83 The
Convention also contains guarantees relevant to criminal procedure, such as
provisions requiring prompt notification of the charges faced by an arrested
person,84 a speedy trial or release pending trial,85 a fair and public trial,86 the
assistance of counsel,87 the opportunity to present evidence and to confront the
prosecution’s evidence,88 and the presumption of innocence.89
Provisions
contained in Protocol 7 to the Convention establish a right of appeal in criminal
cases90 and prohibit prosecution or punishment twice for the same offense.91
Persons who claim to have suffered a violation of such rights may apply to the
ECtHR for redress.92 In the event that it finds a violation, the Court’s primary
remedial power is declaratory, but member states have thus far complied with its
80. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). See, e.g., John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype”
and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259 (2006) (discussing context in which Congress passed
AEDPA).
81. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006).
82. Paul L. McKaskle, The European Court of Human Rights: What It Is, How It Works, and Its
Future, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 4 (2005).
83. Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom, arts. 9-11, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
84. Id. art. 5, § 2.
85. Id. art. 5, § 3.
86. Id. art. 6, § 1.
87. Id. art. 6, § 3(c).
88. Id. art. 6, § 3(d).
89. Id. art. 6, § 2.
90. Protocol 7, art. 2.
91. Protocol 7, art. 4.
92. ECHR, supra note 83, art. 34.
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rulings.93 As a result of the right of individual application and the presence in the
ECHR of criminal procedure provisions, in cases raising such issues, “the
jurisprudence is beginning to resemble the habeas corpus jurisprudence in the
United States whereby federal courts review whether state court criminal trials
have complied with the United States Constitution.”94
The ECJ has jurisdiction to enforce member state compliance with EU laws.95
Until relatively recently, cooperation among EU member states regarding criminal
matters occurred largely outside the EU framework.96 Nevertheless, and with
greater frequency in recent years, criminal cases can raise questions of EU law, as
when a defendant argues that the national law on the authority of which the State
prosecutes violates EU law.97 When the possibility of conflict between national
and EU law arises in a criminal prosecution in a member state court, that court can
refer the legal issue to the ECJ for resolution.98 The referral must come from the
member state court; the defendant has no right to bring the case to the ECJ and no
right to insist on a referral to the ECJ.99 If, after a referral, the ECJ determines that
the national law at issue violates EU law, the conviction also violates EU law and
must be set aside.100
The role of the ECJ in the post-trial judicial review of criminal convictions is,
thus, narrow. The ECJ has jurisdiction only to decide questions of EU law, and
thus only can act in criminal cases in which a question of EU law arises. Even in
such cases, the ECJ can act only when a member state court refers a question
involving EU law to it, and “[g]enerally speaking, national courts seem to be
reluctant to refer” cases to the ECJ.101 However, if “a party takes the position that
national law must be set aside in favor of overriding Union rules, it may force the
national court to take a position” on the legal question.102
In some respects, the ECtHR and the ECJ play a role in the architecture of
Finnish post-trial judicial review similar to the role played by federal habeas courts
in the United States.103 The international treaties establish a body of law with
which Finnish courts must comply, just as the United States Constitution
93. McKaskle, supra note 82, at 31. Finland regards decisions of the ECHR as binding. See KKO
2008:24.
94. McKaskle, supra note 82, at 25.
95. For a discussion of the ECJ’s role in regards to social policy, see Carlos A. Ball, The Making of
a Transnational Capitalist Society: The Court of Justice, Social Policy, and Individual Rights under the
European Community’s Legal Order, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 307 (1996).
96. VALSAMIS MITSILEGAS, EU CRIMINAL LAW 5 (2009). For information about EU member state
cooperation in criminal justice, see Criminal Justice Specific Programme (2007-13), EUROPEAN UNION,
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/judicial_cooperation_in_
criminal_matters/l10110_en.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
97. See, e.g., KKO 2004:58 (involving defendant’s claim that EU law superseded Finnish tax law
for evasion for which defendant was prosecuted).
98. ANDRE KLIP, EUROPEAN CRIMINAL LAW 43 (2009).
99. Id. at 278, 284.
100. Id. at 277.
101. Id. at 282.
102. Id. at 284.
103. For a comparison of federalism in the United States and in Europe, see generally George A.
Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 331 (1994).
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establishes a body of law with which American state courts must comply. The
ECtHR and the ECJ can apply that externally-defined body of law to Finnish
criminal cases, just as federal habeas courts can apply the United States
Constitution in state prosecutions. In both Finland and the United States, the
international or federal court applies an “exhaustion” requirement, obliging
prisoners to present their claims first in the Finnish or state court before seeking
redress in the international or federal court.104 Even the content of the law enforced
by the ECtHR, in declaring general principles of fair procedure, shares much in
common with the criminal procedure amendments to the United States Constitution
enforced by federal habeas courts.
In some procedural respects as well, the ECtHR and the ECJ function like
federal habeas courts. The ECtHR principle of “subsidiarity” illustrates such a
similarity. That principle holds that “the primary enforcers of human rights within
each member state are the courts of that state.”105 The principle implies “that each
member state must be granted some flexibility in applying the principles
enunciated in the Convention.”106
The AEDPA’s deferential standard of review has much the same effect of
allowing flexibility and permitting different states to interpret constitutional rights
differently. Only when the Supreme Court clearly states that some application
violates the Constitution will federal habeas courts declare state courts to have
violated the Constitution in following the disapproved interpretation. Similarly, the
subsidiarity principle does not extend so far as to allow a state to “act in variance to
a clearly expressed standard contained in the Convention or in the decisions of the
Court that interpret the Convention.”107
Another similarity involves the reliance of the international and federal courts
on Finnish and state court fact-finding, respectively. In the United States, federal
habeas courts have the capacity to take new evidence relevant to the federal law
claims, but relatively rarely do so.108 The ECtHR has rules that enable it to engage
in fact-finding, but its practical capacity for independent inquiry into the underlying
facts is limited.109
In other respects, important differences distinguish ECtHR and ECJ review
from federal habeas review. The American federal habeas system places federal
courts in every state, and circuit courts of appeal provide intermediate appellate
review for geographically-defined groups of states. That structure of federal courts
beneath the United States Supreme Court allows the federal habeas system to
accommodate large numbers of cases from individual states, and thus give an
interpretation of federal law that bears directly on local practice and conditions.

104. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982) (federal habeas exhaustion requirement). The
ECJ exhaustion requirement inheres in the rule requiring a reference from a national court, and the
ECtHR similarly requires exhaustion. See ECHR, supra note 83, art. 35(1).
105. McKaskle, supra note 82, at 51.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 52.
108. RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
1007 (6th ed. 2011).
109. McKaskle, supra note 82, at 22-23, 39.
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By contrast, the ECtHR and the ECJ are single courts, without a structure of
lower international courts beneath them. As a consequence of that fact and of the
obligation, in the case of the ECtHR, to accept for review all cases that present a
credible claim,110 the ECtHR especially has large caseloads and long processing
delays.111 The caseload management problem is aggravated by the fact that the
ECtHR serves a community of nations that has an aggregate population three times
larger than the population of the United States.112
As a result, ECtHR review may not influence practice in any one individual
country as much as federal habeas review influences practice in the United States.
Two considerations account for this. First, because of the size and number of other
countries it serves, the ECtHR has decided relatively few Finnish cases raising
criminal procedure issues. Finland ratified the ECHR in 1990, and the first case
challenging an action of the Finnish government was decided by the ECtHR in
1994.113 In the twenty years since ratification, the ECtHR has entered judgments in
151 Finnish cases, and rejected 2874 applications as “inadmissible,” a category
which includes applications that fail to state a claim of violation, that are untimely,
or that do not demonstrate the exhaustion of domestic remedies.114 In 119 of those
151 cases, the ECtHR found Finland in violation of the Convention.115 Just
twenty-six percent of those findings of violation involved claims of violation of
Article 6 right to a fair trial provisions.116 A further forty percent involved
violations of the Article 6 provisions relating to the length of trial proceedings.117
Not all such cases necessarily involve criminal trials. In 2010, the ECtHR made
judgments in 17 cases originating in Finland, finding violations in 16 such cases.118
Two cases involved fair trial rights, and eight involved length of proceeding
claims.119 Because of the relatively small number of cases the ECtHR can take
from Finland, the ECtHR lacks the ability to assess and regulate Finnish criminal
procedure as comprehensively as federal habeas courts can assess and regulate a
state’s criminal procedure.

110. Id. at 39-41.
111. Id. at 58.
112. Id. at 39-41, 64-72.
113. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNTRY FACT SHEETS 1959-2010, at 19 (2011)
[hereinafter COUNTRY FACT SHEETS], available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/C2E5DFA6B53C-42D2-8512-034BD3C889B0/0/FICHEPARPAYS_ENG_MAI2010.pdf. Data are given as of
January 1, 2011.
114. Id.; McKaskle, supra note 82, at 17.
115. COUNTRY FACT SHEETS, supra note 113, at 19.
116. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, STATISTICS 1959-2010: STATISTICS ON JUDGMENTS BY
STATE 3 (2011), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/E6B7605E-6D3C-4E85-A84D6DD59C69F212/0/Graphique_violation_en.pdf.
117. Id. In response to the ECtHR decisions finding Finland in violation, in 2009 Finland passed a
statute establishing domestic remedies for unduly delayed cases. See 362/2009 Laki oikeudenkäynnin
viivästymisen
hyvittämisestä,
available
at
http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2009/
en20090362.pdf (English translation).
118. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, VIOLATIONS BY ARTICLE AND STATE 1 (2011),
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/596C7B5C-3FFB-4874-85D8-F12E8F67C136/0/
TABLEAU_VIOLATIONS_2010_EN.pdf.
119. Id.
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Second, because of the greater legal and cultural diversity of the countries
within its jurisdiction, ECtHR decisions about practices in other countries may
have little to offer, in terms of guidance, to Finnish lawyers and judges. As
McKaskle notes, “the participating countries do not share a common source of law
and have major cultural differences. A substantial number are, at best, emerging
democracies.”120 Though there is some legal and cultural diversity amongst
American states, its extent pales in comparison to Europe’s. Consequently, federal
habeas court decisions from other states and circuits with similar judicial practices
can illuminate the meaning, and thus encourage the avoidance of violations, of
federal law by a state court.
Another notable distinction between federal habeas and ECtHR jurisprudence
is the frequency with which the ECtHR finds violations in the cases that present an
admissible claim. Even before the advent of the AEDPA standard of review, the
prisoner did not usually prevail. After the AEDPA, federal habeas relief is much
harder to win. However, if the preliminary finding of inadmissibility reflects a
judgment on the merits of a claim, the proportion of findings of violation to
findings of non-violation by the ECtHR may resemble more nearly the proportion
in federal habeas courts.
The legal and cultural diversity of Europe also fosters controversy or
ambiguity about matters more clearly settled in federal habeas practice. For
example, in the ECtHR context, “there are legitimate issues as to exactly what the
nature of the review of member state decisions should be.”121 Moreover, there is
controversy over the extent to which different cultures and conditions in different
member states should permit the ECtHR to find that a practice that would violate
the Convention in one state does not violate the Convention in another.122 Taken
together, these considerations make federal habeas a more effective and influential
system of oversight than the ECtHR can be.
The comparison of Finnish and American federalism supports one final
conclusion. Whereas practical considerations contrived to give Finland greater
freedom of action than the United States in the choice of whether to have appellate
courts receive evidence, practical considerations in regards to federalism permit in
the United States the operation of a more effective federal review than Finland can
achieve, at least so long as the only Finnish federalism is international.
II. THE ORIGINS OF POST-TRIAL JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
Both Finland and the United States are relatively young countries, each
governed before independence by culturally-influential empires. Prior to its
independence in 1917, Finland was for centuries a part of Sweden, and then for a
little more than a hundred years the Russian Tsar’s Grand Duchy. The United
States, of course, was part of the British Empire. As a consequence, both countries
received a legal tradition that originated elsewhere, and in both countries, that
tradition remains influential. In this Part, the article describes the origins and

120. McKaskle, supra note 82, at 43-44.
121. Id. at 44.
122. Id. at 49-51.
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development of each country’s system of post-trial judicial review of criminal
convictions.
A. The Origins and Development of Finnish Post-Trial Judicial Review
Although part of the Russian Empire between 1809 and 1917, Finland
occupied a special position within that empire, and Russian judicial institutions
were not imposed to any great extent on Finland.123 Only within the last twenty
years of Russian rule was any determined effort at Russification undertaken, and it
had not progressed very far when interrupted by the Russian Revolution, the fall of
the Tsar, and Finnish independence.124 After independence, a short but bitter civil
war between Red and White factions in Finland led to the defeat of the Reds and a
repudiation of Russian influences on Finnish civic life.125 With respect to the legal
system, those circumstances left the legal traditions derived from the older Swedish
influence, which had persisted through the period of Russian rule, predominant.126
A detailed examination of the Swedish legal system falls outside the scope of
this article.127 It is sufficient for present purposes to note that Sweden’s legal
system belongs within the continental civil law tradition.128 As Marshall has
shown, antecedents of the right to appeal a criminal conviction in that tradition
appear in Roman law.129 After a period of legal decentralization in the feudal
middle ages, the right to appeal a criminal conviction was reborn in the continental
tradition in the effort of monarchies to re-capture previously dispersed powers.130
One mechanism for centralizing power was the assertion of appellate
jurisdiction over local courts.131 Appellate courts could more effectively exert
control if not bound by any principle of deference to the decisions of lower courts.
Hence, the ecclesiastical court tradition of full de novo review proved attractive to
the centralizers and became typical in the continental civil law system.132 Thus did
a system of appellate de novo review of all questions of law and fact take root in
the continental system.
A Swedish law code was promulgated in 1734.133 That code, though
comprehensively amended since, remains the basis of Swedish law.134 More
significantly for present purposes, the 1734 code also forms the basis, though of
123. DAVID KIRBY, A CONCISE HISTORY OF FINLAND 75-78 (2006).
124. Id. at 122-23, 137-49.
125. Id. at 161-63.
126. A short summary of Finnish legal history is available in English at Historical Background of the
Finnish Legal System, FINLAND MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, http://www.om.fi/en/Etusivu/
Perussaannoksia/Historicalbackground (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
127. For useful background, see Bernard Michael Ortwein II, The Swedish Legal System: An
Introduction, 13 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 405 (2003).
128. Id. at 412.
129. Marshall, supra note 16, at 11. See also RANDALL LESAFFER, EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY 3
(Jan Arriens trans., 2009).
130. LESAFFER, supra note 129, at 198-99; Marshall, supra note 16, at 12..
131. Marshall, supra note 16, at 12-13. See also JOHN P. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES 103109 (1960).
132. Marshall, supra note 16, at 13-14.
133. Ortwein, supra note 127, at 411.
134. Id. at 411-12.
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course also comprehensively amended, of the code of judicial procedure still in
force in Finland.135
Several features of it bear mention. As in Sweden,136 appeals in Finnish
criminal cases amount to a trial de novo of such issues of law and fact as an
appellant wishes to raise.137 As in Sweden,138 Finnish law provides for the
participation of lay judges in the trial courts.139
Finland uses different arrangements of fact-finders at trial.140 In some cases, a
single legally-trained or “professional” judge can return a verdict.141 In other cases,
a panel of three professional judges decides the case.142 In cases involving more
serious charges, a professional judge and three or four lay judges decide the case.
Lay judges are selected by municipal councils to serve four-year terms.143
During their terms, lay judges do not work full time in their judicial capacities, but
rather sit on trials on a regular, but part-time, basis. In cases in which lay judges
participate with a professional judge, the verdict is decided by majority vote of all
judges, but professional judges have the prerogative to speak first in the
deliberations.144 In returning a verdict, the court prepares a written opinion,
explaining the reasoning behind the verdict.145 Lay judges do not participate in
deciding cases in the appellate court, that task being left exclusively to professional
judges.146
The fact that lay judges participate in the trial courts but not in the de novo
appeals confirms that the structure of the appellate system puts the lay judges in a
relatively marginal position. Not only do they deliberate in common with the
professional judges in the trial court, but also the verdicts they reach can be
overturned on de novo review by a panel composed exclusively of professional
judges. While the Finnish system grants a place to lay participation in criminal
cases, thereby recognizing some value in a non-professional perspective, that

135. Code of Judicial Procedure, supra note 24. See also LAURI LEHTIMAJA, THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS IN FINNISH CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 1 (1977). A copy of Lehtimaja’s paper is on file
with the author.
136. Ortwein, supra note 127, at 422.
137. See id.
138. Id. at 421.
139. Code of Judicial Procedure, supra note 24, ch. 2, § 1. See generally HANNU TAPANI KLAMI &
MERVA HÄMÄLÄINEN, LAWYERS AND LAYMEN ON THE BENCH: A STUDY OF COMPARATIVE LEGAL
SOCIOLOGY (1992).
140. Code of Judicial Procedure, supra note 24, ch. 1, § 2.
141. Id. ch. 2, §§ 1-3a (in criminal cases, quorum is one professional judge and three lay judges; or
three professional judges); id. § 6 (identifying cases in which judgment can be made by professional
judge only).
142. Id. § 1.
143. For a general description of Finnish lay judges, see Lay Judges, FINNISH MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
(Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.oikeus.fi/17306.htm.
144. Code of Judicial Procedure Act, supra note 24, ch. 23, § 1; Criminal Procedure Act, supra note
36, ch. 10.
145. Code of Judicial Procedure, supra note 24, ch. 23; Criminal Procedure Act, supra note 36, ch.
11, §§ 4, 6.
146. Code of Judicial Procedure, supra note 24, ch. 1, §§ 3-4; Id. ch. 2, § 8.
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perspective is, ultimately and by means of the system of appellate review,
subordinated to the perspective of professional judges.147
Probably the most significant recent development in Finnish post-trial judicial
review involves the accession in the 1990’s by Finland to the treaties that establish
the ECtHR and the ECJ. The implications of those courts for Finnish post-trial
judicial review have already been described.
B. The Origins and Development of American Post-Trial Judicial Review
As noted above, the American system of post-trial judicial review divides, for
state prisoners, into three phases: direct appeal, state post-conviction, and federal
habeas. To some extent, each phase developed independently of the others. This
article therefore addresses each in turn.
1. Direct Appeal
At common law, post-trial judicial review of a conviction was available to
some extent in the trial court, via a motion for a new trial.148 Such a motion
became available in England by the late 17th century.149 At least two significant
limitations applied to such motions. First, because they were filed in the trial court,
they did not bring to bear the fresh perspective on the case associated with review
by other judges in an appellate court. Second, the law specified that evidence
presented through a motion for a new trial be newly discovered.150 Given the
further restriction that the motion be filed during the same term of court in which
the trial was held,151 such motions afforded an opportunity only to prisoners who,
very soon after trial, discovered new information bearing on the issue of guilt. In
effect, thus, the common law motion for a new trial amounted to the recognition of
a brief waiting-period after the verdict designed to allow for the consideration only
of slightly delayed information.
At common law, post-trial review of a conviction outside the trial court was, if
anything, even more limited. The “criminal appeal, in the common law world, is of
recent origin.”152 England’s system of common law courts, unlike the civil law
courts found on the continent in the Middle Ages, did not confront at that time a
similarly powerful centralizing force. As a consequence, in England, such
possibilities of post-trial judicial review of criminal convictions as then existed
were infrequently invoked and did not develop into vehicles for the comprehensive
reconsideration of the trial or the verdict. Similarly, in America and in other
common law countries before the mid- to late-nineteenth century, convicted
147. Moreover, it appears that the frequency of use of lay judges in Finnish cases is dropping. Turun
Sanomat, Number of Lay Judges Plummets, HELSINKI TIMES (March 31, 2011, 9:29AM),
http://www.helsinkitimes.fi/htimes2/finnish-papers/14831-number-of-lay-judges-plummets.html (noting
that in 2006, lay judges were used in Finland in about 29,000 cases; in 2010, they were used in about
6,000 cases).
148. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 408 (1993) (discussing common law provision for motions
for a new trial).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Marshall, supra note 16, at 4.
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defendants had few options for post-trial review, and those they did have tended to
be “disappointingly impotent.”153
For example, an early method of reviewing verdicts, attaint, involved a review
of the first jury’s verdict by a second jury composed of twice as many persons.154
If the second jury found the first verdict erroneous, “the verdict was reversed, the
[original] jurors lost their chattels, were jailed for at least a year, and were
accounted infamous.”155 Moreover, to the extent that attaint was available at all in
criminal cases, it was not available to review guilty verdicts, and thus was a remedy
available to the prosecution but not to the defense.156
The common law device for the appellate review of criminal convictions most
influential in America was the writ of error.157 By it, a higher court could require a
lower court, after judgment in the lower court, to “send up the record . . . for review
of errors apparent on it.”158 The “record” as known to the common law did not
include any report of the evidence at trial, but rather consisted of “the judge’s
commission, the indictment, the plea of the defendant, the verdict, together with
entries kept in the minute book, such as the names of the jurors, an abstract of the
indictment, a memorandum of the pleas, verdict, and sentence.”159 The writ of
error proved “an unsatisfactory appellate remedy” because the “appellate court
could review only errors apparent on the record, which on the one hand contained a
mass of useless items and on the other hand took no notice of the rulings on the
evidence, nor the instructions by the court to the jury, not to mention errors of fact
such as the innocence of the defendant.”160
Succeeding the writ of error in some states was the “bill of exceptions.”161 The
bill of exceptions afforded a means by which a disappointed litigant could
challenge rulings on motions and objections.162 Various procedural and practical
obstacles, though, delayed the development of the bill of exceptions as a robust
vehicle for the review of the fairness of trial. First, not until well into the
nineteenth century were bills of exceptions understood to be available in criminal
cases.163 Moreover, even after the expansion of the bill to criminal cases, its filing
did not necessarily imply a stay of the judgment. Thus, for example, in a midnineteenth century Missouri criminal case, the courts allowed the filing of a bill of
exceptions but did not stay the defendant’s execution, and he was therefore hung
before any appellate examination of the case could take place.164 Beyond those
procedural obstacles, the practical and technological limitations of nineteenth
153. Id. at 6.
154. ORFIELD, supra note 21, at 15-16.
155. Id. at 16.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 22.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 24.
161. See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, III, Stories of Crimes, Trials, and Appeals in Civil War Era
Missouri, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 349, 359-60 (2009) (describing the development of criminal appeals in
Missouri).
162. Id. at 359.
163. Id. at 360.
164. Id. at 362-65.
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century practice inhibited the development of appellate review of criminal
convictions. As Professor Bowman notes, “the importance of the advent of
shorthand reporters in 1887—and of their absence before—can hardly be
exaggerated.”165
Without a tradition of appellate examination of criminal convictions, no
substantial body of case law existed, leaving lawyers and trial courts without the
materials on which to base and decide appellate arguments challenging the fairness
of trial procedures.166 As a result, to mid-nineteenth century lawyers, “the idea of a
fair trial implied one good, thorough airing of the facts before a local judge and
jury, with ample opportunity for the lawyers to exercise their rhetorical gifts.”167 In
that world, the need for a criminal appeal scarcely existed. Thus, in the United
States, “the proposition that those convicted of crimes should have the right to
challenge their convictions only took root around the turn of the twentieth
century.”168 In the federal system, the Judiciary Act of 1889169 “first established
the right to appeal a conviction in federal court,” though limited initially to capital
cases.170
In England, around the same time, some notorious miscarriages of justice led
to the establishment of a right to a more thorough criminal appeal.171 The appalling
case of Adolf Beck would, one must hope, embarrass any legal system into reform.
Beck was arrested in London in 1895 and subsequently convicted for thefts
perpetrated against a series of vulnerable women to whom the perpetrator presented
himself as a nobleman, prospective employer, and lover.172 The evidence against
Beck consisted of the eyewitness identification testimony of the victims. At the
time of Beck’s prosecution, his lawyer recalled that frauds substantially identical in
every detail had been committed in London in 1877, presumably by the same man.
In 1877, a man who had given his name as John Smith had been convicted and
served time for those crimes. Beck, a 54-year old Norwegian former sailor, offered
to prove that he had lived in Peru in 1877; therefore, he could not have committed
the prior crimes and thus had not committed the charged crimes. The prosecution
found a police officer involved in the 1877 case who would testify that Smith and
Beck were the same man. In fact, as was later discovered, a man named Thomas
Smith committed both the 1877 and 1895 crimes. The trial court excluded all
evidence about the prior crimes, thus rendering irrelevant Beck’s proof of his
former Peruvian residence. Beck’s attempt to appeal on that ground failed because
the trial court refused to certify the case for appeal.
165. Id. at 367.
166. Id. at 367-72.
167. Id. at 372.
168. Marshall, supra note 16, at 4.
169. Act of Feb. 6, 1889, ch. 113, § 6, 25 Stat. 655, 656 (1889).
170. Paul D. Carrington, Justice on Appeal in Criminal Cases: A Twentieth Century Perspective, 93
MARQ. L. REV. 459, 462 (2009).
171. Marshall, supra note 16, at 8.
172. This summary of the Beck case is drawn from a 2004 article recalling the case. Brian Cathcart,
The
Strange
Case
of
Adolf
Beck,
THE
INDEPENDENT
(Oct.
17,
2004)
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/the-strange-case-of--adolf-beck-6159841.html. See also
Marshall, supra note 16, at 8. For a record of the case, see TIM COATES, THE STRANGE STORY OF
ADOLPH BECK (Stationary Office ed. 1999) (1904).
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Beck served five years. In the second year of his imprisonment, a prison
official examined old 1877 prison records relating to Smith and found a reference
to the fact that Smith had claimed to be Jewish and was found to be circumcised.
Prison officials then examined Beck, discovered that he and Smith could not be the
same man, and made a report to that effect to Beck’s trial judge. Nevertheless, the
judge declined to re-open the case, and nobody informed Beck of the discovery nor
took any further action. Beck served his sentence and was released in 1901. Three
years later, Smith’s commission of several identical frauds brought to the mind of
the investigating officer the 1895 cases. In due course, the police arrested Beck
and the 1904 victims identified him as the perpetrator. Beck’s plea to the jury at
trial—”Before God, my maker, I am absolutely innocent of every charge brought
against me. I have not spoken to or seen any of these women before they were set
against me by the detectives”—proved unavailing in the face of the eyewitness
identification testimony, and he was again convicted. Only with Smith’s
subsequent capture in the course of the commission of an identical fraud, and his
confession to all of the crimes, did Beck’s ordeal end. The notoriety of such
events, in combination with technological and legal advances, ultimately produced
in the common law countries our current, more expansive version of criminal
appeal.173
For present purposes, the crucial point is that a substantial form of appellate
review in the United States emerged only after the establishment of the fact-finding
primacy of the jury. When appellate review developed, it developed in the light of
that established principle and has offered as yet no ultimately successful challenge
to it. History, therefore, may account as much as any logic for our characteristic
appellate deference to jury fact-finding.
2. Federal Habeas Corpus
In the second half of the twentieth century, scholars debated the content of the
post-independence and nineteenth century habeas protection.174 On one account,
habeas corpus initially authorized federal courts, in a post-conviction context, to
inquire only into the fact of the conviction and the subject matter and territorial
jurisdiction of the convicting court. Habeas did not traditionally permit any inquiry
into the conviction’s substantive justice or the lawfulness of the legal processes that
produced it.175 In the 1870’s, the writ expanded to encompass an inquiry into
whether a prisoner had been convicted or sentenced under an unconstitutional
statute; claims challenging the procedures by which the conviction was obtained
remained outside the scope of the writ.176 Further expansion followed early in the
twentieth century to allow federal habeas courts to inquire into whether prior state
court proceedings had allowed full and fair presentation of claims. Finally, in a

173. At least one scholar disputes the claim that criminal appeals did not exist in the United States
much before the turn of the twentieth century. See Marc M. Arkin, Rethinking the Constitutional Right
to Appeal, 39 UCLA L. REV. 503, 521-542 (1992).
174. HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 108, at 40.
175. Id. at 41.
176. Id.
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series of cases in the middle of the twentieth century, the writ expanded to permit
federal court review of claims of any constitutional violation.
The second account is associated with Justice Brennan’s opinion in Fay v.
Noia.177 On that account, the scope of the habeas inquiry did not enlarge over time;
rather, the legal protections granted to defendants evolved. On that view, habeas
corpus was always a “forum for providing specified classes of prisoners with
review of the legality of their detention under existing standards of due process.”178
The evolution affected only the content of the existing standards of due process.
After noting flaws in both accounts, Hertz and Liebman conclude that federal
habeas amounted to a limited appellate procedure, in that “it has lain only to claims
of particular national importance.”179 It also constituted a “substitute” procedure,
in the sense that “habeas corpus has never duplicated, but has always mirrored the
scope of, Supreme Court review on direct appeal.”180
This article takes no position as between those accounts of the development of
federal habeas corpus in America. For present purposes, it is sufficient just to note
that “[a]lthough the line between legal and factual questions has changed over time,
the scope of both modes of review has always been de novo on legal claims and
deferential-to-nonexistent on factual findings.”181 Moreover, “innocence claims
and their close cousins, claims that the penal statute was not intended to reach a
particular prisoner’s conduct, are both nationally unimportant because sui generis,
and subject to no or little review because aimed at the central fact determination at
trial.”182 Thus, federal habeas corpus has never provided a forum for de novo
reconsideration of a prisoner’s guilt.
3. State Post-Conviction Review
As early as the colonial period, habeas corpus was known to courts in
America.183 Upon independence, a number of states recognized the writ in their
constitutions or by statute.184 In the first decades after independence, the writ as
applied in state courts afforded a relatively narrow basis for reviewing
convictions.185 Only in the mid-twentieth century did the movement toward
modernizing and expanding state post-conviction review emerge.186
The emergence of state post-conviction review responded to the mid-twentieth
century development of a more robust federal habeas review. A federal habeas
doctrine developed that required federal habeas courts to respect prior state court
decisions denying relief on federal law claims, out of respect for state authority.
177. 372 U.S. 391, 394 (1963).
178. HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 108, at 42.
179. Id. at 45.
180. Id. at 47.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. DONALD E. WILKES, JR., STATE POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF HANDBOOK 29-31
(2010-2011 ed.).
184. Id. at 30-31.
185. Id. at 31-32.
186. Nancy J. King & Joseph L. Hoffman, Envisioning Post-Conviction Review for the Twenty-First
Century, 78 MISS. L.J. 433, 434 (2008). See also WILKES, supra note 183, at 32, 36-42.
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The classic example of such a federal habeas doctrine is the “adequate and
independent state law grounds” principle.187 By that principle, if the state court
rejected a prisoner’s federal constitutional claim on the basis that the prisoner had,
in presenting the federal claim in state court, violated a state law procedural rule,
the federal habeas court was bound also to reject the federal claim, out of respect
for the state law procedural rule, at least if that rule met certain conditions.188
For example, if the state court enforced a rule of procedure that required a
defendant to make a federal claim at a certain time in the case, and the prisoner
raised the claim later in violation of that rule, the enforcement of the state law
timing rule would justify the state court in denying the federal claim, regardless of
the federal claim’s intrinsic merits. In order to take advantage of the opportunity
that federal habeas doctrine presented, the state courts needed to have such
“adequate and independent” procedural rules. In order to have those rules, the state
needed to offer some judicial forum in which the federal claim could be raised.
Because some claims, such as ineffective assistance of counsel, cannot coherently
be raised at trial, states therefore needed to have systems of post-trial judicial
review available for the litigation of such claims.
No reason exists to think that the direct appeal – state post-conviction review –
federal habeas system has reached its final form. Dissatisfaction persists with the
system. Some scholars have proposed a radical re-structuring that would change
and limit state post-conviction review and federal habeas in favor of an increased
emphasis on direct appeal.189
For example, evidently frustrated with its system, in 1989, the Arkansas
Supreme Court abolished the court rule that provided a comprehensive scheme of
post-conviction review in that state’s courts.190 The abolition left available to
Arkansas state prisoners only the “narrower” post-conviction remedy defined by
Arkansas’s version of habeas corpus, in which a court could hear only claims that
the “commitment is valid on its face or whether the convicting court had proper
jurisdiction.”191 However, soon afterwards, perhaps having realized that the
narrowing of state post-conviction review could permit federal courts a freer hand
in reviewing federal habeas petitions from Arkansas state prisoners, Arkansas reestablished a broader state post-conviction review.192
C. Conclusion
In the civil law tradition, the possibility of broad post-trial review of a criminal
conviction developed much earlier as a part of the process of centralizing
governmental functions and power. In that context, a strong principle of deference
to the trial court did not emerge. Centralization through appellate review requires
the capacity to communicate information about the case from the local court to the

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

See generally HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 108, at 1403-1535.
Id. at 1403-405.
King & Hoffman, supra note 186, at 433.
Whitmore v. State, 771 S.W.2d 266 (Ark. 1989).
Id. at 267 n.1 (citation to both the text of the opinion and the footnote).
ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.1.
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central authority. Before the advent of professional shorthand court reporting,
appellate review thus required a predominantly written trial process:
Writing was . . . the key to this change and it is ironic that almost the first
and certainly the most potent use of wider literacy was this capture of
criminal justice by the crown and the greater magnates. The major
technique adopted by royal judges and prosecutors in France for bringing
the seigneurial courts within the jurisdiction of the crown was the
revolutionary concept of appellate review, which was facilitated by
literacy.193
In the common law tradition, the right to appeal a criminal conviction
developed relatively recently, and in response more to a concern to avoid
miscarriages of justice than as an instrument of the centralization of government
power. For centuries, English trials remained primarily oral events, and thus
resisted appellate review beyond the formalities subject to examination via the writ
of error.194 As a result, appeals as to matters of substance developed after the
emergence and establishment of the idea that jury verdicts in criminal cases are
entitled to deference and finality.
III. THE MATERIAL OF POST-TRIAL JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
Having examined the architecture and origins of post-trial judicial review, the
article next considers the material of that review. What sort of inquiry do
reviewing courts undertake when called upon to examine the legality of a criminal
conviction? The article divides its description into two parts. The first focuses on
the kinds of claims a prisoner can bring against the validity of a conviction. The
second part focuses on waiver arguments by which the prosecution can justify a
reviewing court in upholding the conviction, regardless of the merits of a prisoner’s
challenge to the validity of a conviction.
A. Claims of Error
Finland and the United States differ with regard to the content or focus of posttrial judicial review. In the United States, post-trial judicial review tends to avoid
or constrain any direct inquiry into the justice of the jury’s verdict. Instead,
reviewing courts examine the rulings by which the court structured the trial.
However, as shown below, an inclination to find means to inquire into the factual
justice of the conviction persists in the United States and has given rise to a number
of procedural claims that come close to, without quite being, a direct inquiry into
the factual justice of the conviction.
In Finland, post-trial judicial review tends not to focus on procedural or
structural complaints about the trial. Instead, appeals typically challenge the
outcome of the trial—the factual accuracy of the verdict. Various considerations
account for the factual, rather than procedural, focus of the Finnish criminal appeal.
These include the relatively less procedurally dense nature of the Finnish trial and

193. RICHARD VOGLER, A WORLD VIEW OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 31 (2005).
194. Id. at 132.
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the opportunity to rectify any procedural errors in the process of re-trying the case
on appeal.
The article explores these contrasts further in three categories. The first
encompasses challenges to trial court procedural or trial management rulings. The
second includes challenges to the factual accuracy or substantive justice of the
verdict convicting the defendant. The third contains a kind of composite of the first
two: nominally procedural or trial management claims that engage the reviewing
court relatively directly in an examination of the factual justice of the conviction.
1. Claims of Procedural Error
In the American system, in each of the three phases of post-trial judicial
review (direct appeal, state post-conviction review, and federal habeas), the
prisoner’s challenge to the conviction most often alleges procedural or structural
errors in the trial, rather than an erroneous verdict.195 Appellants commonly raise
arguments about, for example, such matters as the adequacy of the charging
document, the State’s compliance with its pre-trial disclosure obligations, the
content of jury instructions, or such structural considerations as the timing or
location of trial and the adequacy of jury selection as a test of the qualifications of
the jurors. Significantly, with the exceptions discussed below, post-trial judicial
review of a conviction does not directly involve a claim that the prisoner is
innocent of the charge.196
That being the case, the question of the prisoner’s guilt or innocence can be
irrelevant to the success of the argument advanced on appeal. A defendant
erroneously denied a change of venue, for example, will succeed in an appeal
challenging a conviction regardless of the strength of the evidence of guilt.
Because the flaw identified by such a successful appeal affects only the trial
process, rather than the trial outcome, the consequence of a successful appeal is not
acquittal, but rather the cancellation of the conviction on the understanding that the
prosecution can usually try to win conviction again after a second trial.
In some instances, the strength of the evidence of guilt can bear on the success
of such challenges to trial court procedural rulings. By operation of the harmless
error rule, the absence of any doubt about the prisoner’s guilt may defeat an appeal
that otherwise identifies a genuine procedural flaw in the trial.197 That rule, though,
only applies in one direction. The Supreme Court has not recognized the presence
of doubt about guilt as justifying relief in the absence of procedural error,198
although the Court has held that a strong showing of innocence may excuse a
195. Findley, supra note 55, at 591.
196. Id. at 601-602.
197. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (recognizing applicability of harmless error
analysis to federal constitutional claims); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (discussing
harmless error analysis as applied in federal habeas). For a history of the establishment of the harmless
error rule, see Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., A Fair Trial, Not a Perfect One: The Early Twentieth Century
Campaign for the Harmless Error Rule, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 433 (2009). The fact that the harmless error
rule came into existence during the first half of the twentieth century supports the conclusion that a right
to a broad criminal appeal did not exist in the United States before that time.
198. See infra Part III.A.2 (discussing Supreme Court cases noting, without yet deciding, whether
convicting innocent person violates Constitution).
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prisoner’s default of a claim alleging a procedural error.199 Except in the
circumstances described below in which doubt itself forms the basis for the
challenge to the conviction, the presence of doubt does not make what would
otherwise be a correct procedural ruling into an erroneous one justifying
reversal.200
American courts recognize an exception to the availability to the prosecution
of the harmless error argument. In cases involving a procedural error that is
“structural” in nature, the error requires reversal without regard to the strength of
the evidence of the defendant’s guilt.201 Some controversy can attend the question
of whether a particular error is “structural,” and thus immune from harmless error,
or is rather a “trial error” subject to a harmless error analysis.
In Finland, procedural complaints about the trial cannot form the basis for an
appeal unless a law specifically permits the procedural ground in question to be
appealed.202 Beyond that rule barring the appeal of certain procedural rulings, at
least two considerations account for the relative rarity of Finnish procedural
appeals. First, many of the procedural complaints that form the bases of American
criminal appeals simply do not arise in the Finnish courts. For example, to a large
extent, with regard to the regulation of the information available for consideration
by the fact-finders at trial, Finland adheres to the principle of free evaluation of
evidence.203 By that rule, the fact-finder is charged with applying an appropriate
discount to the value of information introduced in a flawed form, such as hearsay.
Trials, therefore, tend to involve disputes about the value and implications of
evidence, rather than about the admissibility of evidence. In the absence of trial
rulings about the admissibility of evidence, one cannot base a challenge to a
conviction on such a ruling. Thus, Finnish appeals tend to focus on a challenge to
the trial court’s judgment about the value and implications of evidence, as
expressed in the written order explaining the verdict.204
Also, Finland regulates police investigatory conduct largely by means of
training and discipline. Only rarely is evidence excluded from a trial on the ground
that the police violated a law in discovering it.205 As a consequence, Finnish trials
199. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
200. See infra Part III.A.2.
201. For a description and critique of the structural error exception to the availability of the harmless
error argument, see Steven M. Shepard, The Case Against Automatic Reversal of Structural Errors, 117
YALE L.J. 1180 (2008).
202. Code of Judicial Procedure, supra note 24, ch. 25, § 1(3). See also Criminal Procedure Act,
supra note 36, ch. 3, § 4 (barring appeal of rulings to separate or join civil claims and criminal charges
in single trial); id. ch. 4, §§ 8-9 (non-appealability of ruling transferring case from one trial court to
another).
203. See generally HEIKKI PIHLAJAMÄKI, EVIDENCE, CRIME AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION: THE
EMERGENCE OF FREE EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE IN THE FINNISH NINETEENTH CENTURY CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE (1997). In adhering to the free evaluation of evidence, Finland’s legal system closely
resembles Sweden’s. Ortwein, supra note 127, at 432.
204. See, e.g., RHO 5:2001 (appeal challenging bank robbery conviction on basis of quality of
evidence presented).
205. See KKO 2007:58 (holding that fact that evidence has been obtained by illegal means does not
necessarily mean that it is inadmissible; however, evidence which has been obtained in serious violation
of the law may be excluded on a case-by-case basis); KouHO 2004:5 (Sept. 23, 2004) (discussing
admissibility of unlawfully obtained information; holding that court may on a case-by-case basis
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and pre-trial proceedings typically do not involve litigation about the means by
which evidence has been discovered. Thus, Finnish appeals likewise rarely focus
on the means by which the police have discovered evidence.
A second reason for the relative absence of procedural complaints as the bases
for challenges to Finnish convictions lies in the fact that, in Finland, post-trial
judicial review affords an opportunity to redo whatever part of the trial seemed to a
litigant to have been incorrectly handled.206 That being the case, a defendant
dissatisfied with the trial court’s treatment of some procedural issue can, on appeal,
seek in the appellate court a reconsideration of that treatment in the context of a
broader reconsideration of the case.207
Finnish post-trial judicial review sometimes does involve an examination of
trial procedures. Some kinds of procedural or structural errors affecting the trial
must be appealable because their nature makes the error not subject to correction in
a de novo appeal. Classic examples of such errors would include the right to a
speedy trial,208 the right not to be tried twice for the same offense,209 the denial of
an impartial judge,210 and an error in extraditing a defendant.211
In some cases, Finnish post-trial reviewing courts hear claims of procedural
error of a sort that could be corrected in a de novo appeal.212 Such claims can arise
in the context of a review of the factual justice of the conviction. For example, in
KKO 1995:66, the Finish Supreme Court heard the appeal in a case of a father who
allegedly, while a passenger in a car driven by his son, grabbed the steering wheel
causing an accident. At the father’s trial, relying on a testimonial privilege
available to close family members of an accused defendant, the son did not testify.
The prosecution introduced a statement the son had made during the pre-trial
investigation. Because that statement formed the basis for the conviction, the
Supreme Court confronted the question of whether its use violated the testimonial
privilege. Finding that it did, the Supreme Court held that the statement could not
be used, and thus acquitted the defendant.213
Moreover, Finland recognizes certain kinds of procedural errors as sufficiently
significant that they can be raised even in the extraordinary review phase.214 Thus,
consider the admissibility of such evidence, taking into account the values and goals protected by
declaring the evidence inadmissible, the requirements of a fair trial, the significance of the evidence as
well as the pursuit of finding out the substantive truth).
206. See, e.g., KKO 1995:44 (noting that parties have opportunity in court of appeals to provide
additional evidence not provided in the trial court).
207. See, e.g., KKO 1999:123 (noting that appeal of procedural ruling closing the case is not
possible, but that consideration of a claim of error in such a ruling could be considered to extent it bears
on appeal of trial court’s ultimate decision in case).
208. See, e.g., HelHO 2006:5 (adjudicating claim that trial proceedings were excessively long); KKO
2006:33 (same).
209. See, e.g., KKO 2010:82.
210. See, e.g., KKO 2000:21.
211. Code of Judicial Procedure, supra note 24, ch. 31, § 9b.
212. See, e.g., KKO 1995:5 (ordering new trial where trial court accepted as evidence statements
made during pre-trial investigation, without allowing defendant to pose questions on subject during
trial); I-SHO 1993:8 (ordering new trial for violation of defendant’s right to call certain witness at trial).
213. See also KKO 2000:71 (involving similar procedural error, and similarly resulting in acquittal
on appeal); KKO 2008:68 (same).
214. Code of Judicial Procedure, supra note 24, ch. 31, § 1.
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appeals have addressed claims of procedural error where the procedure in question
implicates a human rights principle identified in the ECHR.215 For example, citing
an ECHR provision, a Finnish appellate court held that a trial court erred in
denying the defendant’s right to examine a co-perpetrator whose statement was
used in support of the defendant’s conviction.216 Finally, the possibility of posttrial judicial review of procedural rulings exists in Finland, as it must, as a means
for deciding, on a consistent basis, important disputes about the interpretation of
those rules.217
2. Claims of Factual Injustice in Conviction
Challenges to Finnish convictions tend to focus on questions relating to guilt
or innocence. In some cases, such appeals contest, in whole or in part, the trial
court’s resolution of the factual truth of the charge.218 In other cases, such appeals
raise a legal question about whether the criminal law prohibits the conduct proven
to have been committed.219
When such an appeal involves a dispute about the facts of the case, if a Finnish
appellant believes that the trial court improperly under- or over-valued certain
evidence, the appellant can present that evidence again in the appellate court.220
The prisoner may also present in the appeals court evidence not presented at trial,
without regard to whether the evidence could have been presented at the trial.221 If
a Finnish prisoner discovers new evidence after the direct appeal bearing on the
justice of the conviction, the prisoner may initiate the extraordinary review process
in the intermediate court of appeals and present the evidence there.222 No deadline
focused on the passage of time exists since the trial limits that right.223 In deciding
whether new evidence presented after the conclusion of the ordinary appeal
justifies vacating the conviction, the Finnish appellate court determines whether the
new evidence “would probably have led to the acquittal of the defendant or to the
application of less severe penal provisions to the offence, or there are compelling
215. See, e.g., KKO 2009:9 (denial of right to impartial judge); KKO 2007:36 (resolving in
extraordinary appeal claim of procedural error, and remanding for new trial); KKO 2004:24 (on
evidentiary significance of defendant’s choice to remain silent); KKO 1993:19 (trial without counsel
and without adequate time to prepare and present defense); I-SHO 1993:8 (denial of right to present
defense witnesses); VaaHO 1993:5 (denial of right to be present in court during testimony of
prosecution witnesses).
216. VaaHO 1992:1.
217. See, e.g., KKO 2003:12 (defendant convicted in trial court of insurance fraud theft; on appeal,
prosecutor brings charge of aggravated theft, and appellate court convicts thereon; in Supreme Court,
defendant argues that prosecutor could not bring new charge for first time in appellate court; Supreme
Court holds that, under particular circumstances here, bringing of new charge in appellate court did not
violate defendant’s right to fair trial).
218. Code of Judicial Procedure, supra note 24, ch. 25, § 1 (barring appeal of district court
procedural ruling, except in certain circumstances); id. § 7 (can restrict grounds for appeal to part of
judgment).
219. See, e.g., KKO 2000:45 (relating to the elements of the crime of slander).
220. Code of Judicial Procedure, supra note 24, ch. 25, § 15; see also, e.g., KKO 2000:62 (finding
error in appellate court’s refusal to hold evidentiary hearing).
221. Code of Judicial Procedure, supra note 24, ch. 25, § 17 (civil cases); Id. ch. 26, §§ 13-15.
222. Id. ch. 31.
223. Id. ch. 31, §§ 8-14.
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reasons . . . to reconsider the question of whether or not the defendant had
committed the offence for which he or she has been convicted.”224
No discussion of the differences between Finnish and American post-trial
judicial review of a conviction would be complete without noting that Finland,
unlike the United States,225 affords the prosecution the opportunity to seek posttrial judicial review of acquittals.226 In some respects, the prosecution’s right to
seek review is narrower than the defendant’s. For example, the prosecution
confronts deadlines not applicable to defendants when the prosecution seeks to
invoke the extraordinary review powers of Finnish courts to the detriment of the
defendant.227
In the American system, an appeal raising a legal question about whether the
criminal law prohibits the proven conduct can of course be raised, and because
such an appeal poses a legal question, the reviewing court will decide the case
without deference to the lower court’s judgment on the question of law.228 To that
extent, no significant distinction between the American and Finnish systems of
post-trial judicial review exists. A distinction does exist, however, between the
systems in regards to their treatment of claims challenging the factual basis of a
conviction.
In the American system, in only two circumstances does a claim of innocence
become the direct focus of inquiry in post-trial judicial review. The first occurs
when a court confronts a claim that the prosecution, at trial, introduced insufficient
evidence to support the conviction.229 Because the court in the context of
sufficiency claims considers only the evidence presented at trial, that post-trial
review operates on a record that is closed at the end of the trial. The second occurs
when a court receives new evidence bearing on the issue of the prisoner’s guilt,
typically either at a motion for a new trial or at a post-conviction evidentiary
hearing. Both types of claims operate under constraints that make them less than a
de novo reconsideration of the question of the prisoner’s guilt.
American courts distinguish between two types of closed-record appellate
claims of innocence.230 A claim that the prosecution introduced insufficient
evidence refers to the “legal standard which is applied to determine whether the
case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the
224. Id. ch. 31, § 8(3).
225. For a discussion of the prosecution’s right of appeal in American criminal cases, see Anne
Bowen Poulin, Government Appeals in Criminal Cases: The Myth of Asymmetry, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1
(2008).
226. See Code of Judicial Procedure, supra note 24, ch. 25, § 19 (referring to public prosecutor’s
right of appeal).
227. Compare id. ch. 31, §§ 8 & 8a, with id. § 9.
228. Such legal questions can arise in various ways, such as, for example, whether the legislature can
constitutionally prohibit the conduct, see, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (finding
unconstitutional the criminal prohibition of consensual homosexual conduct), whether the legislature has
enacted a constitutionally-adequate statute for prohibiting certain conduct, see, e.g., City of Chicago v.
Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (addressing claim that criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague), or
simply whether the terms of the statute were intended by the legislature to cover the defendant’s
conduct.
229. E.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). See also Oldfather, supra note 49, at 471-79
(discussing appellate review of claims of insufficient evidence).
230. See, e.g., State v. Spinale, 937 A.2d 938, 944-46 (N. H. 2007) (explaining the distinction).
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jury’s verdict as a matter of law.”231 The prosecution’s proof may be legally
insufficient either if there is no evidence at all tending to prove an essential
element, or if the evidence that is presented on some essential element is such “that
it cannot be said reasonably that that the intended inference” of guilt “may logically
be drawn” from that evidence.232
This form of closed-record review involves not only the constraint that it may
take no account of evidence not presented at trial, but also that the reviewing court
must, in reviewing the prisoner’s claim of insufficient evidence, “uphold the jury’s
verdict unless no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
considering all the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light
most favorable to the State.”233 In other words, to prevail on a claim of insufficient
evidence, a defendant must show that the verdict was irrational. And in
considering that question, the court must resolve any conflict in the evidence in
favor of the prosecution.
A prisoner can also present a second kind of closed-record review challenge to
a conviction, in addition to the sufficiency challenge. Thus, “[a]lthough a verdict
may be supported by sufficient evidence, a trial court may nevertheless conclude
that the judgment is against the weight of the evidence.”234 Such a claim focuses
on the persuasiveness of the evidence, rather than on its capacity to support a
logical inference of guilt. Thus, whereas an inquiry into sufficiency investigates
whether the prosecution has met its burden of production at trial, an inquiry into the
weight of the evidence investigates whether the prosecution has met its burden of
persuasion.235
But such “weight” claims also operate under significant constraints in the
American system. A jury verdict must be unreasonable before the trial court can
set it aside on the basis of the weight of the evidence.236 Moreover, a prisoner who
pursues a “weight” claim in an appellate court after losing it in the trial court does
not receive the de novo review applicable to claims of legal error. Rather, the
appellate court will defer to the trial court’s judgment denying the motion “unless it
was made without evidence or constituted an unsustainable exercise of
discretion.”237 However, if the prisoner prevails in the trial court on a “weight”
claim and the prosecution appeals, the appellate court exercises a searching review.
“This more stringent standard of review is to ensure that proper deference is given
to a jury’s factual determinations.”238
Such closed-record claims can also be pursued in federal habeas on the theory
that a conviction unsupported by sufficient proof violates the United States
Constitution’s guarantee of due process of law.239 The decision in Jackson v.

231. Id. at 944.
232. Id. at 945.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 946.
235. Id. See also Findley, supra note 55, at 618.
236. Spinale, 937 A.2d at 947.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (so holding); Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31 (1982)
(recognizing that “weight” claims also can raise federal constitutional issues).
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Virginia created some controversy as to the nature of the review of the evidence the
Federal Constitution requires of appellate courts.240 In the end, most courts and
commentators have concluded that the requisite review is “highly deferential.”241
A measure of the significance of that deference appears in the consensus view that
“appellate courts almost never reverse convictions on sufficiency grounds.”242
Regrettably, the record of success on such claims, even when brought by
defendants subsequently proven to be innocent, is poor.243
While the Supreme Court has, to the extent described above, recognized that
the Constitution is violated when a court convicts a defendant on insufficient
evidence, the Court has yet to recognize a claim that the Constitution is violated
when a court convicts an innocent defendant. In that distinction, one sees revealed
the tendency of American post-trial judicial review to examine the trial, rather than
the underlying event. The Court has come the closest to recognizing the
constitutional status of a claim of innocence in capital cases posing the question
whether it would violate the Constitution to execute an innocent person.244 Even
that claim has only tenuous status, having been described by the Court as
“hypothetical.”245 No prisoner who has brought such a claim has ever succeeded,
even including some defendants subsequently shown by DNA evidence to be
innocent.246 In Troy Davis’s case, however, the Court behaved as if such a claim
exists in remanding for an evidentiary hearing on Davis’s claim of innocence.247
Although a claim of innocence brought on the basis of new evidence does not
necessarily have constitutional status, most, if not all, states empower their courts
by rule or statute to hear such claims. The usual vehicle for such open-record
claims is the motion for a new trial. Such motions have traditionally operated
under significant limitations.248
Many jurisdictions require that the evidence be newly discovered after trial,
and not reasonably available or discoverable at the time of trial.249 Many
240. Oldfather, supra note 49, at 471-79.
241. Id. at 478.
242. Id.
243. Findley, supra note 55, at 602-603.
244. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009); House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006); Herrera v. Collins, 506
U.S. 390 (1993). For a discussion of the nuances of those decisions and for an argument that the Court
should recognize that the Constitution is violated by the conviction of an innocent person, see Brandon
L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629 (2008). In so arguing, Professor Garrett follows
the lead set by Judge Friendly in an influential 1970 article. See Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence
Irrelevant?: Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142 (1970). For a discussion
of whether the Court may soon recognize such a claim, see Kathleen Callahan, Note, In Limbo: In re
Davis and the Future of Herrera Innocence Claims in Federal Habeas, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 629 (2011).
245. House, 547 U.S. at 555. See also Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009) (to
same effect).
246. Garrett, supra note 244, at 1691.
247. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1.
248. See Garrett, supra note 244, at 1670-73. (describing traditional doctrines governing new
evidence claims of innocence). See also generally Albert D. Brault & John A. Lynch, Jr., The Motion
for New Trial and Its Constitutional Tensions, 28 U. BALT. L. REV. 1 (1998); Daniel S. Medwed, Up the
River Without a Procedure: Innocent Prisoners and Newly Discovered Non-DNA Evidence in State
Courts, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 655 (2005) (discussing state motion for new trial restrictions).
249. See, e.g., State v. Cossette, 856 A.2d 732, 737 (N.H. 2004); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.850(b)(1); FED.
R. CRIM. P. 33.
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jurisdictions enforce a time limit that prevents a prisoner from presenting even
newly discovered evidence if too much time has passed since trial.250 The length of
those limitations varies, ranging “from a mere twenty-one days to three years.”251
Also, while some jurisdictions grant judges some discretion with respect to the
standard by which to evaluate a claim of innocence, others impose a high burden of
persuasion on the defendant.252 Moreover, motions for a new trial are typically
filed in the trial court, and when later reviewed by an appellate court, that court’s
appellate review of the significance of the new evidence is constrained by
deference owed to the trial court’s judgment.253 Finally, many jurisdictions regard
a motion for a new trial as part of the post-conviction review process, rather than as
part of direct appeal, and thus offer the opportunity to the prisoner several years
after the trial, and after the constitutional right to the appointment of counsel has
expired.254 For all these reasons, the open-record review implicit in a motion for a
new trial does not afford American appellate courts anything close to a de novo
consideration of the verdict on the basis of fuller information.
A century ago, cases involving miscarriages of justice prompted the emergence
in English law, and perhaps in American law also, of a broader form of criminal
appeal than had been available via the writ of error.255 So also in recent years, a
new crisis has undermined confidence in the capacity of the criminal adjudication
system to distinguish the guilty from the innocent. As a result of DNA testing,
some 289 wrongly-convicted prisoners have been exonerated in the United
States.256
In many of the DNA-exoneration cases, the process of post-conviction judicial
review ran its course without vacating the erroneous conviction, and the system of
post-trial judicial review had no remaining mechanism available for examining a
prisoner’s claim to be able to prove innocence through DNA evidence.257 Some
scholars have argued that the American system of post-trial judicial review must,
for that reason, be accounted largely a failure, at least by the criterion of whether
the review corrects the erroneous convictions of innocent persons.258 Studies of the
DNA-exoneration cases show that persons subsequently proven innocent fared no
250. See Medwed, supra note 248, at 666-86. For a discussion of the issues implicated by time limits
on motions for a new trial in this context, see Penny White, Newly Available, Not Newly Discovered, 2
J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 7 (2000).
251. Garrett, supra note 244, at 1671; see also Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 410-11 (1993)
(listing state statutes of limitation, with reference to length).
252. Garrett, supra note 244, at 1671.
253. E.g., Cossette, 856 A.2d at 737.
254. Findley, supra note 55, at 605. Professor Findley notes that, in this regard, Wisconsin
constitutes a notable exception, in treating motions for a new trial involving new evidence as part of the
direct appeal. Id. at 610-13.
255. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
256. Facts
on
Post-Conviction
DNA
Exonerations,
INNOCENCE
PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/ Content/351.php (last visited January 30, 2012).
257. See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (2008) (comprehensively
analyzing the trial and post-trial reviews of the first 200 prisoners proven innocent by DNA evidence);
Garrett, supra note 244 (addressing similar issues); David Wolitz, Innocence Commissions and the
Future of Post-Conviction Review, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 1027, 1028-29 (2010) (discussing limitations and
flaws of American post-conviction review as a vehicle for vindication of claims of innocence).
258. See Findley, supra note 55, at 637; Garrett, supra note 257, at 55, 94.
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better in the appellate process than do appellants generally.259 Absent some reform
or supplementation of post-trial judicial review, it falls to the possibly uncertain
hands of an executive authority, either in the person of a prosecutor who will drop
the charges or a parole board that pardons or otherwise releases the prisoner, to end
the unjust incarceration of the innocent.260
The failure of the prior trials and appeals of the DNA-exonerated prisoners to
vindicate their innocence has prompted calls for reform of American post-trial
judicial review.261 Some scholars argue that appellate courts should henceforth
review trial court findings of fact with much less deference.262 A reform of that
sort has arrived in English appellate courts with the establishment of their power to
review the facts and vacate a conviction deemed to be factually “unsafe.”263 In
support of greater appellate scrutiny of jury fact-finding, it has been noted that
“[e]mpirical research reveals that appellate courts in the United States uphold
sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges in up to half of all civil appeals—a rate that
far exceeds such holdings in criminal cases.”264 The capacity for intensive
appellate court review of the facts thus exists; only the will to apply it in criminal
cases is presently lacking.
A second, and perhaps narrower, response to the DNA-exoneration crisis has
involved the creation of a new form of judicial review, usually focused specifically
on DNA evidence.265 In 1999, only two states, New York and Illinois, had such
statutes.266 Since then, such statutes have spread throughout the country, to the
point that almost all states now have such a statute.267 Consistent with the
American predilection for constraining post-trial review of jury factual findings,
those statutes have restrictions that limit their availability and effectiveness as
vehicles for the reconsideration of guilt in the face of a claim of provable

259. Findley, supra note 55, at 593-601; Garrett, supra note 257, at 98-104.
260. Garrett, supra note 244, at 1672-73 (noting that in 20% of the cases involving the first 200
prisoners proven innocent by DNA evidence, relief ultimately came from a Governor rather than a
court); Douglas H. Ginsburg & Hyland Hunt, The Prosecutor and Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence:
DNA and Beyond?, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 771 (2010) (discussing role of prosecutor in context of postconviction claims of innocence); Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and
Post-Conviction Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467 (2009); Daniel S. Medwed, The
Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125
(2004) (same); Wolitz, supra note 257, at 1030 (noting some hazards associated with reliance on
executive review).
261. Oldfather, supra note 49, at 481; Findley, supra note 55, at 608.
262. Oldfather, supra note 49; Findley, supra note 55, at 631-36.
263. David J. Feldman, England and Wales, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra
note 51, at 193-94; D. Michael Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts: The Need for Reformed Standards for the
Trial and Review of Factual Innocence Claims, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1281 (2004).
264. Findley, supra note 55, at 633.
265. See WILKES, supra note 183, at 17-23 (noting that 47 states and the District of Columbia now
have such statutes); Garrett, supra note 244, at 1719 (in appendix, cataloguing state post-conviction
DNA testing statutes). See also Dwight Aarons, Adjudicating Claims of Innocence for the Capitally
Condemned in Tennessee: Embracing a Truth Forum, 76 TENN. L. REV. 511 (2009) (recommending
review commission); Wolitz, supra note 257 (despairing of post-trial judicial review, and
recommending a commission form of review).
266. See Garrett, supra note 244, at 1673 (summary of types of restrictions).
267. Id. See also Callahan, supra note 244, at 632 (recent listing of such statutes).
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innocence.268 The range of prevalent restrictions includes a threshold showing of
materiality that is often strictly construed,269 a limitation to DNA testing to the
exclusion of other kinds of newly discovered evidence,270 limitations to prisoners
convicted of certain serious crimes,271 a due diligence obligation with regard to the
effort to obtain testing, and a bar on testing where defendants had pled guilty,272
among other restrictions.273 The United States Supreme Court has held that there is
no constitutional right to post-conviction access to prosecution evidence for the
purpose of DNA testing.274
In the post-trial judicial review of claims challenging the factual basis for the
conviction, American courts are constrained by filing deadlines and obligations of
deference to the jury and to the trial court. Those rules limit the extent to which a
court, engaged in the task of post-trial judicial review of a conviction, can vacate it
on the ground of doubts about the prisoner’s guilt. As a result of such constraints
and restrictions, American “courts consistently have adopted more favorable
standards of review for non-guilt-related claims than for those claims most likely to
be tied to guilt and innocence.”275 By contrast, Finnish courts, engaged in the
process of post-trial judicial review of a criminal conviction, do not operate under
so many constraints with respect to their consideration of claims of factual
innocence.
3. Claims of Factual Injustice Implicit in Procedural Claims
In Finland, because substantive grounds for challenging a conviction do not
implicate any principle of deference to the trial court, prisoners have no reason to
develop and present procedural claims that conceal within them, or otherwise
implicitly involve, a substantive challenge to the conviction. In the United States,
on the other hand, direct substantive challenges to convictions are disfavored and
constrained because they are perceived as inviting the reviewing court to intrude on
the province of the jury. Consequently, prisoners have a reason to develop and
present formally procedural claims that involve an inquiry into the substantive or
factual accuracy of the conviction.
Indeed, one need not necessarily regard such claims as subterfuges.
Procedural claims and substantive claims do not exist in separate universes.276 If
doubts truly exist about a convicted prisoner’s guilt, in a well-designed system of
criminal adjudication, one might expect, and would hope, to find some procedural
268. Garrett, supra note 244, at 1675-84.
269. Id. at 1676-77.
270. Id. at 1679.
271. Id. at 1680.
272. Id. Of the first 200 prisoners exonerated by DNA evidence, nine had pled guilty. See Garrett,
supra note 257, at 74.
273. Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 63 (2009).
274. Id. at 72.
275. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice,
107 YALE L.J. 1, 61-62 (1997). See also Findley, supra note 55 (discussing extent to which American
appellate process involves inquiry into claims of innocence).
276. Other than Fourth Amendment claims, which do exist in a universe separate from substantive
claims about guilt, insofar as Fourth Amendment claims involve the suppression of reliable evidence of
guilt.

2012]

POST-TRIAL JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS

463

or structural flaw in a trial that produced such a doubtful conviction. By regulating
the quality of the trial, therefore, the American appeal indirectly aims to assure the
accuracy of the trial’s verdict.277 A procedurally and structurally flawless trial that
produces an erroneous or doubtful verdict should be almost, if not entirely, a
contradiction in terms. As noted above, though, recent American experience seems
to belie that hope, insofar as persons subsequently proven to be innocent fare no
better in their appeals than do the class of appellants in general.
It is perhaps, therefore, not surprising that the American system of post-trial
judicial review has developed procedural or structural claims of error that amount
almost to a direct inquiry into the prisoner’s guilt. Three types of such claims exist.
First, there are claims that the trial court erred in an evidentiary ruling, either by
admitting prosecution evidence it should have excluded, or by excluding defense
evidence it should have admitted. Second, there are claims that the defense lawyer
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.278 Third, there are claims that the
prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence from the defense.279
All three types of claims account for the trial’s erroneous outcome by
reference to a defect in the information presented to the fact-finder. That defect
can consist either in the jury hearing and considering information it should not have
had or in withholding from the jury some information it should have had.
Considered from that point of view, the three claims differ only in their attribution
of blame. The first blames the trial judge for an improper ruling about the
admission of an important item of evidence. The second blames the defense lawyer
for failing to fulfill the responsibility of zealous representation. The third blames
the State, usually the prosecutor or the police, for concealing material and
exculpatory information.
The three claims together likely amount to an American prisoner’s best
opportunity for post-trial judicial review of the question of factual guilt. However,
even taken together, the three claims do not amount to a de novo review of the
question of guilt. One can readily imagine circumstances in which the parties are
justifiably ignorant of important evidence at the time of trial. In such cases, neither
the prosecutor nor defense counsel can be faulted for failing to use or disclose that
evidence, and if neither party proffers the evidence, the trial court will have made
no ruling, erroneous or otherwise, on its admissibility.
For example, techniques of scientific investigation may come into existence
after trial that, when applied to evidence in the case, yield significantly new
information. The Troy Davis case arguably involves another example of such late
discovered evidence, in the eyewitnesses who professed certain confidence in their
identifications of Davis as the perpetrator at the time of trial, but afterwards
disclose doubts.280 Otherwise, though, one or more of the three claims will provide
the means for challenging a conviction, as the newly discovered evidence on which
the defense relies on appeal will involve matters either known to the prosecution, or
277. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 170, at 471-72 (offering such a statement of the purpose of the
American criminal appeal).
278. The lead case for such claims is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
279. A foundational case for such claims is Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
280. For a discussion of the Davis case, see Joshua M. Lott, The End of Innocence: Federal Habeas
Corpus Law After In Re Davis, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 443 (2011).
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reasonably knowable by the defense lawyer, or known to both and proffered, at the
time of trial.
Consistent with their function as vehicles for linking a procedural error with an
erroneous outcome, all three claims require the prisoner to show, on appeal, that the
error “prejudiced” the defense. Thus, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, in addition to showing that the lawyer performed deficiently, the
prisoner must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”281
An essentially identical standard applies to the review of claims that the State
withheld exculpatory evidence.282 When adjudicating a claim of trial court error in
the admission or exclusion of evidence, reviewing courts similarly consider
whether the ruling “prejudiced” the defense.283 The claims thus share in common a
standard of review. Although phrased in terms that do not require the defendant to
prove innocence to prevail, the standard of review does not amount, in theory or in
practice, to a de novo reconsideration of guilt. Rather, as the poor record of such
claims when brought by subsequently-proven prisoners shows, “such procedural
claims have not served well the goal of protecting innocent defendants from
wrongful convictions.”284
The claims share another similarity. Although, as noted above, a showing of
doubt about the prisoner’s guilt is necessary to the success of the claim, it is not
sufficient. In the case of a claim of trial court error in an evidentiary ruling, the
court’s basis for the ruling must have been invalid. In the case of a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, the prisoner will not prevail merely by showing
that defense counsel did or failed to do some action that prejudiced the defense; the
prisoner must further show that the judgment that motivated counsel’s decision was
deficient.285 In the case of a claim that the prosecution withheld material and
exculpatory evidence, the prisoner must show not only that the evidence was
material and exculpatory, but also that the State had the information at the time of
trial but did not disclose it.286
Claims challenging the competency of defense counsel, or alleging the
withholding by the State of exculpatory evidence, are almost, if not entirely,
unknown to Finnish post-trial judicial review.287 Like American law, Finnish law
recognizes a right to counsel that encompasses, for indigent criminal defendants, a
right to the appointment of counsel.288 Several factors tend to diminish the
frequency of claims made by Finnish defendants, relative to American defendants,
that their lawyers rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.
281. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
282. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).
283. See, e.g., State v. Villeneuve, 999 A.2d 284, 287 (N.H. 2010).
284. Findley, supra note 55, at 601.
285. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
286. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
287. The problem of incompetent attorneys, of course, is recognized by Finnish law. See Code of
Judicial Procedure, supra note 24, ch. 15, §§ 10a, 13. The problem is addressed, though, by sanctions
directed at the attorney. The system of post-trial judicial review affords the convicted defendant an
opportunity for reconsideration of the question of guilt.
288. Criminal Procedure Act, supra note 36, ch. 2.
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First, unlike American criminal defendants, Finnish criminal defendants have a
right to choose between the appointment of a legal services attorney and a private
attorney.289 The fact that Finnish defendants may choose their attorneys likely
diminishes the chance that, after trial, the Finnish defendant will feel dissatisfied
with the attorney’s performance. Second, Finnish courts tend to impose
imprisonment much less often and for shorter periods than their American
counterparts. Finland has one of the world’s lowest rates of incarceration per
capita.290 A defendant not subjected to the experience of incarceration is less likely
than one who is to pursue an appeal to the extent of alleging the defense lawyer
ineffective. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the qualities of the Finnish
appeal tend to reduce the occasion for claims of ineffective assistance. As already
noted, the appeal offers convicted defendants the opportunity to present new
evidence. Thus, a defendant dissatisfied by a lawyer’s performance at trial in some
respect can remedy it on appeal by presenting the case without the alleged defect.
Finnish law also recognizes the possibility of claims alleging the production of
false evidence at trial or the withholding by a witness of significant exculpatory
evidence.291 It does not appear common, though, that the police or a prosecutor
would withhold such evidence from the defense. Finnish law establishes
essentially an open-file policy, giving both prosecution and defense equal and full
access to the police investigative file.292
4. Conclusions
These considerations support some conclusions about American and Finnish
regulation of the arguments prisoners may make during the post-trial judicial
review of the conviction. First, in the United States for the most part, post-trial
judicial review of a conviction involves the adjudication of claims alleging error in
the procedural or structural management of the trial, rather than in the trial’s
outcome itself. In that sense, one can say that, in the American system, the trial
explores the issue of the defendant’s guilt; the post-trial judicial review explores
the issue of the fairness of the trial. Post-trial review does not repeat the trial
court’s inquiry into the question of whether the defendant is in fact guilty of the
crime charged. In Finland, the opposite conclusion holds. For the most part, posttrial judicial review does not focus on the trial, but rather on the underlying
question of the prisoner’s guilt.
Second, in both systems, exceptions to each country’s primary orientation
exist, as neither system has sustained a purely procedurally or purely factually
oriented system of post-trial judicial review. In the United States, prisoners can
challenge the finding of guilt, but such claims are constrained by deadlines and by
deference to the trial court’s fact-finding prerogative. Claims combining a

289. See KKO 1996:48 (recognizing right to defense through chosen legal counsel, even where
chosen counsel already represented another suspect in same case).
290. See Finland Home to Fewer Prisoners, YLE (Nov. 29, 2010, 7:53PM),
http://www.yle.fi/uutiset/news/2010/11/finland_home_to_few_prisoners_2180603.html (noting that
Finland has second lowest number of prisoners per capita in European Union).
291. Code of Judicial Procedure, supra note 24, ch. 31, § 8.
292. Criminal Investigations Act, supra note 76, § 11.
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procedural and substantive focus afford the reviewing court a greater freedom with
regard to assessing the likelihood of the defendant’s guilt than do claims focused
exclusively on the substantive justice of the conviction. The recent development of
DNA-specific post-trial judicial review constitutes a narrow form of substantive
review, but within its scope, it affords reviewing courts authority to inquire into a
prisoner’s claim of innocence. In Finland, prisoners can make certain kinds of
claims about trial procedures not connected directly with the adjudication of guilt,
particularly if the claim raises a matter covered by the ECHR, or if the claim
involves a matter not susceptible to correction in a de novo appeal.
B. Waiver of Claims of Error
Both Finland and the United States have rules that enable courts engaged in
post-trial judicial review of convictions to reject a challenge to a conviction
regardless of the merits of the prisoner’s claims. In the American system’s
harmless error doctrine, we have already seen one mechanism by which a
reviewing court can avoid deciding a claim challenging a ruling relating to trial
structure or procedure. Harmless error, though, constitutes a means for avoiding a
procedural challenge to a conviction by reference to the conviction’s substantive
justice. In this section, the article considers mechanisms by which a post-trial
reviewing court can avoid a procedural or substantive challenge to a conviction by
reference to some other procedural value. For example, in both countries, a
prisoner’s failure to give timely notice of the intent to appeal a conviction can
result in the rejection of an appeal without regard to the merits of the prisoner’s
challenges.
In Finland, filing deadlines constitute essentially the only mechanism available
to reviewing courts to avoid deciding the merits of a prisoner’s claim. Thus, a
prisoner can lose the right to appeal by an untimely declaration of the intent to
appeal.293 A prisoner can also lose the right to appeal by failing to appear at the
appeal hearing.294 However, Finnish courts do not necessarily enforce those rules
rigidly. A defendant who can show an excuse for failing to meet the filing
deadlines can obtain merits review of the case.295
American courts, on the other hand, tend to enforce filing deadlines fairly
rigidly. In Bowles v. Russell,296 for example, a federal judge informed a habeas
petitioner, in the presence of the State’s counsel, that the petitioner had seventeen
days, until February 27, to file a notice of appeal, when in fact the law permitted
only fourteen days.297 Bowles filed his notice on February 26. The appeals court
then found Bowles’s notice untimely, and dismissed his appeal. The Supreme
Court affirmed that ruling.298 More recently, the Supreme Court has marked an
outer limit to the strictness of application of filing deadlines, at least in cases in

293. Code of Judicial Procedure, supra note 24, ch. 25, §§ 9, 12.
294. Id. ch. 26, §§ 21-22. See also, e.g., KKO 2004:94 (addressing whether defendant’s failure to
appear at appeal hearing justified dismissal of appeal).
295. Code of Judicial Procedure, supra note 24, ch. 31, §§ 17-18.
296. 551 U.S. 205 (2007).
297. Id. at 207.
298. Id.
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which the petitioner’s counsel abandons the petitioner’s case without so informing
the petitioner, and for that reason a deadline is missed.299
Finland allows the re-opening of cases in the extraordinary review process,
even after a significant period of time has passed since the trial and initial appeal.
For example, in one case, two defendants convicted of theft had lost their case in
the court of appeals in 1996.300 After the passage of some years, and after Finnish
law had been amended to strengthen the right of defendants to examine the
witnesses against them, the defendants initiated an extraordinary appeal on the
grounds that they had not been permitted to question certain prosecution witnesses.
The Finnish Supreme Court agreed, annulled the conviction, and ordered the case
to be retried in the district court. Beyond timing rules, Finland does not impose
waiver rules that allow an appellate court to reject an appeal without regard to its
merit.
The situation in the United States differs. At every phase of post-trial judicial
review of a criminal conviction, waiver rules exist. In important respects, the idea
of waiver of challenges is fundamental to the American system of criminal
adjudication.
The availability and prevalence of plea bargaining is perhaps a central defining
feature of the American system of criminal adjudication.301 Certainly, far more
cases are adjudicated by guilty plea in the United States than are adjudicated by
trial.302 By pleading guilty, a defendant waives the right to adversarial adjudication
and waives many of the claims of innocence and of procedural or structural error
that might otherwise form the basis of post-trial judicial review. Many courts hold
that a defendant who pleads guilty can only seek post-plea judicial review of claims
that allege some improper influence or other defect in the plea process.303
The possibility of instituting some limited version of plea bargaining is under
consideration in Finland.304 At present, though, while a defendant’s willingness to
confess guilt may certainly simplify the trial, it does not avoid the trial’s
necessity.305 Finland does not now have any procedure, other than trial, by which a
court can enter a criminal conviction.
Even for those American defendants who plead not guilty and stand trial,
waiver rules constitute a pervasive limitation on each phase of post-trial judicial
review. On direct appeal, a prisoner may not raise any claim not “preserved” in the
299. Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012).
300. KKO 2007:36.
301. For a discussion of the role of plea bargaining, see Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Should We Really
“Ban” Plea Bargaining?: The Core Concerns of Plea Bargaining Critics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753 (1998).
For a discussion of the origins of plea bargaining in America, see George Fisher, PLEA BARGAINING’S
TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003).
302. See Tina Wan, The Unnecessary Evil of Plea Bargaining: An Unconstitutional Conditions
Problem and a Not-So-Least-Restrictive Alternative, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 33, 33-34 (2007)
(noting that more than 95% of American prosecutions resolve by plea bargains).
303. See Steven Schmidt, Note, The Need for Review: Allowing Defendants to Appeal the Factual
Basis of a Conviction After Pleading Guilty, 95 MINN. L. REV. 284 (2010).
304. Jukka Loiva, Plea Bargaining: The Solution to Problems of Evidence in Economic Offenses,
2008 HELSINKI L. REV. 67 (2008), available at http://www.helsinkilawreview.fi/articles/2008-3.pdf
(containing English abstract).
305. Id. (“the concept [of plea bargaining] is quite unknown to the Finnish legal system”).
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trial court.306 That rule imposes on defendants an obligation to raise their factual
and legal arguments in the first instance in the trial court. If a defendant has not so
preserved the claim in the trial court, the defendant cannot make the argument in
the appellate court.
In many states, appellate courts recognize a “plain error” exception to that rule
of non-reviewability of unpreserved claims.307 However, the significance of that
plain error exception is limited by the fact that it permits the appellate court to
grant relief to the appealing defendant only in rare circumstances. A typical
formulation of the doctrine notes that the plain error rule “should be used sparingly,
its use limited to those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would
otherwise result.”308 As understood by the United States Supreme Court, the
doctrine has four elements: (1) there must be an error; (2) the error must be plain;
(3) the error must affect substantial rights; and (4) the error must seriously affect
the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.309 Thus, many
claims that would have prevailed if the defendant had raised them in the trial court
will not prevail on plain error review unless the error was unusually egregious and
prejudicial.
Waiver rules continue to influence the claims available in state post-conviction
proceedings. First, as a general matter, post-conviction courts will not review
claims previously made and adjudicated during direct appeal.310 In effect, by
having previously raised the claim, the prisoner loses the right to raise it again in
post-conviction proceedings. This limitation avoids the waste of time and effort
perceived to be inherent in relitigating claims already decided.
Second, courts engaged in state post-conviction review often will decline to
address claims that could have been, but were not, presented on direct appeal.311
This rule creates an incentive on the part of the defendant to raise all available
claims at the earliest possible opportunity, for fear of losing the right to raise a
claim if not previously raised.
As a result of those two rules, state post-conviction review is reserved for
claims that neither were, nor should have been, raised at trial or on direct appeal.
To fit within that description, a claim must arise out of circumstances excusably
unknown or otherwise unavailable to the defendant at the time of trial. In
American criminal procedure, such claims tend to take one of three forms, the first
two of which involve facts not available to the defendant before the conclusion of
direct appeal, and the third of which involves rules of law not available to the
defendant until the conclusion of direct appeal.

306. E.g., State v. King, 204 P.3d 585 (Kan. 2009) (discussing Kansas statute requiring
contemporaneous objection at trial to preserve claim of error for appeal).
307. E.g., Steven W. Becker, To Review or Not to Review: The Plain Truth About Illinois’ Plain
Error Rule, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 455 (2006); Morton Gitelman, The Plain Error Rule in Arkansas:
Plainly Time for a Change, 53 ARK. L. REV. 205 (2000); Toby J. Heytens, Managing Transitional
Moments in Criminal Cases, 115 YALE L.J. 922 (2006); Robert J. Labrum, History and Application of
the Plain Error Doctrine in Utah, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 537 (2000).
308. State v. MacInnes, 867 A.2d 435, 439 (N.H. 2005).
309. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997).
310. See, e.g., ALA. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(a)(2), (4).
311. See, e.g., ALA. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(a)(3), (5).
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The most common factual claim reserved for post-conviction proceedings is
the allegation of ineffective assistance of trial or of appellate counsel.312 On
occasion, claims of ineffective assistance arise out of state interference in the
relationship between defense counsel and the defendant.313 In those instances, no
obstacle exists to the presentation of the claim at trial and on direct appeal, and the
procedural bar restricting post-conviction review would apply. Most ineffective
assistance claims, though, involve circumstances which reflect badly on defense
counsel’s preparation or performance.314 In recognition of the fact that defense
lawyers cannot be expected or required to allege or prove themselves to have
performed incompetently, the law understands that a defendant has no obligation to
raise that claim while represented by the allegedly ineffective lawyer.315 Such
claims get litigated in state post-conviction proceedings.
The second typical post-conviction claim arises under the due process
guarantee associated with the decision in Brady v. Maryland.316 Such claims arise
when, after trial, the defense discovers that the prosecution possessed exculpatory
information it did not disclose in time to be used at trial. Necessarily, if the
defendant was faultlessly ignorant at trial about the facts underlying the claim, no
reasonable objection can be made to the defendant’s making such a claim for the
first time in state post-conviction review.
The two claims described above do not necessarily exhaust the possibilities of
post-conviction claims arising out of facts excusably unknown to the defendant at
the time of trial. However, to fall within the safe space between the two procedural
bars, any such claim must arise from facts the defendant neither knew, nor could
reasonably be expected to know, at the time of the trial.
The other variety of post-conviction claim involves matters of law excusably
unknown to the defense at the time of the trial. Here, only one situation fits that
description: the circumstance in which the legislature has enacted, or a court has
recognized, a rule of law that would benefit the defendant but was not
acknowledged or enacted at the time of the defendant’s trial. American law has

312. See Frank B. Cross & James F. Spriggs, II, The Most Important (and Best) Supreme Court
Opinions and Justices, 60 EMORY L.J. 407, 434 (2010) (listing Strickland v. Washington as the Supreme
Court case most cited by federal circuit courts); Adam M. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex:
Reconsidering Summary Judgment Burdens Twenty Years After the Trilogy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
81, 144 (2006) (identifying Strickland as the third-most-cited case by all courts (and as the most cited
criminal case) and as the most cited case, bar none, by state courts). For a case discussing the rare
circumstances under which an American court will consider a claim of ineffective assistance on direct
appeal, on the basis of the trial record alone, see State v. Thompson, 20 A.3d 242 (N.H. 2011).
313. E.g., Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (finding violation of right to counsel in trial
court’s order barring counsel from consulting with defendant during overnight recess in trial); Herring v.
New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975) (finding violation of right to counsel in trial court’s ruling barring
counsel from giving closing argument).
314. See Steinman, supra note 312.
315. See Christopher M. Johnson, Not For Love or Money: Appointing a Public Defender to Litigate
a Claim of Ineffective Assistance Involving Another Public Defender, 78 MISS. L.J. 69 (2008)
(discussing principles that preclude lawyer from alleging self ineffective).
316. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See also Findley, supra note 55, at 600 (“ineffective assistance and Brady
claims constitute the largest proportion of postconviction challenges to convictions”).
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developed principles to determine when such subsequent developments in the law
should be applied retroactively in the case of a defendant.317
Finally, waiver rules also constrain the review of federal habeas courts. The
“exhaustion” requirement obliges a state prisoner to present any federal law claim
in state court before presenting it in federal court.318 The doctrine of independent
and adequate state law grounds obliges a federal court to reject an otherwise
meritorious claim if the state court previously rejected it on a ground other than its
merits, such as a failure to preserve it at trial or to comply with a post-trial filing
deadline.319 The statute of limitations applicable to the filing of federal habeas
petitions obliges a federal court to reject otherwise meritorious claims if they were
filed a day too late.320 The restriction on the filing of a second federal habeas
petition obliges a federal court to reject otherwise meritorious claims presented in
such a petition if the claim was already presented in a prior federal petition.321
Even new claims may not be presented in successive petitions except in narrow
circumstances.322
Several considerations motivate the existence of that set of waiver rules. First,
the rules serve at each stage of post-trial judicial review to privilege the prior stage.
The rule requiring preservation at trial, when regularly applied by appellate courts
on direct appeal, creates an incentive for defendants to present their claims at trial,
at the cost of losing the opportunity to present them in the direct appeal, except
under the unfavorable plain error standard. The post-conviction rule barring the
litigation of claims that could have been, but were not, raised on direct appeal
creates an incentive to raise the claim on direct appeal, at the cost of losing the
opportunity to present it later. The exhaustion rule and the adequate and
independent state law doctrine, applied in federal habeas, create incentives for
litigants to raise claims in state court proceedings, at the cost of losing the
opportunity to raise them in federal habeas. Finally, the special disadvantages
associated with a second, or “successive,” habeas petition creates an incentive for
the prisoner to raise all federal claims in the first habeas petition.
Second, in addition to creating incentives to raise claims at the earliest
opportunity, the waiver rules have the effect of protecting the trial verdict, by
increasing the likelihood that it will be upheld. Throughout the process of post-trial
judicial review, a reviewing court has at least three ways to reject a claim of error.
First, the claim can be rejected on its merits because the trial court did not err.
Second, the claim can be rejected because, although the trial court did err, that error
was harmless in light of all the evidence of the prisoner’s guilt. Third, the claim
can be rejected, even though meritorious and harmful, if the prisoner waived the

317. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
318. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
319. See discussion supra Part II.B.3. See also Kermit Roosevelt, III, Light From Dead Stars: The
Procedural Adequate and Independent State Ground Reconsidered, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1888 (2003).
Very recently, the United States Supreme Court set an outer limit to the severity of that rule, holding
that the failure of lawyers, who have abandoned their client, to comply with a deadline will not be held
against the client. Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 917 (2012).
320. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2006) (establishing statute of limitations).
321. Id. § 2254(b)(1).
322. See generally HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 108, at 1555-1653.
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claim by failing to comply with some procedural requirement defining the claim’s
proper presentation. As a result of their tendency to protect the jury verdict, waiver
rules can interfere with the capacity of courts engaged in post-trial judicial review
of criminal convictions to correct errors. Scholars concerned that the American
system is failing have accordingly suggested reform of waiver rules.323
Third, waiver rules tend to reduce the costs of post-trial judicial review. When
the prosecution has more than one argument which, if successful, would defeat an
appeal, a reviewing court need not assess all of the arguments. Rather, the court
can rely on the one that most readily and simply justifies rejecting the appeal.
IV. CONCLUSION324
A prudent comparative legal analysis proceeds modestly and cautiously when
the moment comes for drawing conclusions:
The job of the comparatist is not simply to compare rules since these are
nothing more than . . . the surface appearance of law. . . . [W]hat the
comparatist must do is get below their surface in order to discover the
cultural mentalité that these rules express. It is not the rule itself that
should be the focus of comparison but what the rule signifies in terms of
the political, social, economic and ideological context from which it has
emerged.325
To understand the meaning of the differences between American and Finnish posttrial judicial review, then, one must look for the underlying policies that have
produced those differences. In short, the task of the comparatist is to make the
familiar strange, and thereby visible.
The effort begins by identifying general principles by which to measure
variations between Finnish and American procedures. Any democracy’s system of
criminal procedure confronts the challenge of embodying and reconciling four
fundamental goals. First, criminal procedure seeks to discover the truth about the
particular events that led to the criminal charges. Other things being equal, a
democracy’s criminal procedure prefers a rule that best promotes the accuracy of
that truth-seeking function. Second, criminal procedure aims to respect the rights
and dignity of people involved in criminal cases. Third, systems of criminal
adjudication operate in a competitive environment, in the sense that other social
and governmental priorities compete for resources with the court system. As a
consequence, considerations of efficiency, as measured in terms of the required
expenditures of money and/or time, can prove important to the evaluation of any
given rule of criminal procedure. Fourth, in democracies, public confidence in the
criminal justice system matters. A criminal justice system should not only be fair
and just: it should also appear to be fair and just.
323. Findley, supra note 55, at 608 n.93 (citing articles to that effect).
324. A version of the first part of this conclusion was published initially in Christopher M. Johnson,
Comparative Criminal Procedure, in TURUN YLIOPISTON OIKEUSTIETEELLINEN TIEDEKUNTA 50
VUOTTA 276-78 (2011).
325. Geoffrey Samuel, Epistemology and Comparative Law: Contributions from the Sciences and
Social Sciences, in EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE LAW 35, 60-61 (Mark Van
Hoecke ed., 2004).
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Within any system of criminal procedure, conflicts between the four goals can
arise. Rare is the rule of criminal procedure that improves on any possible
alternative rule on every criterion. A legal system’s resolution of such conflicts can
reveal something fundamental about that system’s values, and a comparison of two
legal systems’ different choices can likewise prove revealing. One can describe a
system’s enacted rules as “just formalistic shadows of the policy considerations
that underlie them.”326 Caution is called for, however, in interpreting differences in
enacted rules as reflecting different policy considerations. Ideally, democratic
societies choose their rules of procedure advisedly, aware of relevant alternative
choices and of the implications of the options. In that ideal situation, the direct
consequences of procedural rules are intended, or at least anticipated and
understood, and the enacted rules reflect different value judgments.327
However, even in democracies, that ideal situation may not exist in fact.
Because of the enduring influence of history and legal tradition, at any given time
there may be no “necessary logical connection between legal rules, institutions and
structures on the one hand, and the society in which they operate on the other.”328
In addition to tradition, a number of other obstacles can intervene between
community values and procedural rules, such as would undermine the validity of
the assumption that the consequences of the rules are intended and understood. For
example, rules of criminal procedure may reflect the values not of the community
as a whole, but only of the subset of the community that has won the power to
enact procedural rules. With those caveats in mind, some tentative conclusions can
be drawn on the basis of the observed similarities and differences between the
Finnish and the American systems of post-trial judicial review of criminal
convictions.
Let us first consider the provisions and compromises each system makes with
respect to the goal of accuracy. Finland does not require courts engaged in posttrial review of convictions to employ deferential standards of review in the
consideration of issues of fact. In the absence of such deference, the focus of
Finnish post-trial review remains where it was in the trial: on the factual truth of
the charge. The Finnish system does not regard lay participation in adjudication as
endowed with such special importance as to justify protecting it from nondeferential reconsideration. Rather, Finland’s provision of multiple opportunities
for de novo reconsideration of guilt through the structures of direct and
extraordinary review bespeaks a belief that, by repetitive inquiry through the
hierarchy of courts, the last examination shall be at least the equal in quality to the
first.
By contrast, the United States requires courts engaged in post-trial review of a
conviction to enter upon the task in a spirit of substantial deference to the trial court
326. Jan M. Smits, The Europeanisation of National Legal Systems: Some Consequences for Legal
Thinking in Civil Law Countries, in EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra
note 325, at 229, 243.
327. In a sense, of course, a rule’s mistaken or unintended consequences can also reveal something
about the society that enacted the rule. Unintended consequences, perhaps, indicate the society’s blind
spots, while anticipated consequences permit inferences about the society’s preoccupations.
328. Alan Watson, Legal Culture v. Legal Tradition, in EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY OF
COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 325, at 1, 4.
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fact-finder. From the point of view of accuracy, the American choice reflects
either a faith in the unique superiority of trial court fact-finders (most often jurors),
or a compromise of the value of accuracy for the sake of other ends.
Two possible concerns about professional judges as fact-finders could justify a
belief in the fact-finding superiority of laypersons. First, professionals may,
through experience, suffer a degradation in their ability to find facts if, for example,
repeated exposure to cases leads professional judges to form stereotypical beliefs
about certain kinds of cases. Professional judges, having formed such stereotypical
beliefs, may be relatively blind to the possibility that the particular case under
adjudication may not justify the stereotypical conclusion. Second, professionals
may perhaps be more subject to venal corruption than laypersons.
It is difficult to assess the extent to which these concerns are justified in
American circumstances. One reads occasionally of cases of judicial corruption,
but such cases seem quite rare under current American circumstances, and
particularly so in appellate courts.329 With regard to the other possible concern, one
can perhaps make a strong case that stereotypical thinking is at least as likely to
skew the deliberations of novice laypersons as professional judges. Indeed,
professional judges may, by experience, perceive patterns genuinely relevant to
fact-finding that inexperienced laypersons will fail to note.330 Ultimately, given the
willingness of American courts in post-trial review of civil cases to engage in less
deferential review, and the persuasive criticisms that have been made against the
claim that jurors always possess a unique competency as fact-finders, it would
seem that, whatever we may tell ourselves, our principle of mandated deference to
the jury’s fact-finding reflects a compromise of the goal of accuracy in the service
of other ends.331
Indeed, in the American tradition, we do, in the principle of jury nullification,
acknowledge at least one value for which we sacrifice the accuracy associated with
judicial adjudication in favor of a desired inaccuracy associated with jury
adjudication. In the United States, the right to trial by jury took shape in part as a
bulwark against the use of criminal prosecution as an instrument of political
repression.332 Through nullification, the jury disregards the factual truth of
allegations, and acts on what it regards as higher political values.
With respect to sensitivity to the value of efficiency, we find the American
system more keen than Finland’s.333 In offering repeated opportunities for the
presentation of evidence and for the reconsideration of factual issues previously
addressed, Finnish post-trial judicial review contemplates significant duplication of
effort. American courts, by contrast, tend to seek to avoid duplication of effort.
When confronted with a choice between possible rules for a given situation,
American courts often take note of the possibility that a given ruling will invite an
329. One notable story of a corrupt judge involved Martin Manton of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. See United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1939).
330. See People v. McMurtry, 314 N.Y.S.2d 194 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1970) (noting pattern of testimony
across cases suggestive of police perjury in “dropsy” cases).
331. See Oldfather, supra note 49, at 490-94 (noting policy of preserving province of the jury).
332. See generally Arie M. Rubinstein, Note, Verdicts of Conscience: Nullification and the Modern
Jury Trial, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 959 (2006).
333. Oldfather, supra note 49, at 483.
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unmanageable deluge of claims.334 By restricting the presentation of evidence to
trial-level courts, the American system allows appellate courts to handle many
more cases at present staffing levels than would be possible if litigants could
present new evidence on appeal. Through its principle of deference and its waiver
rules, the American system privileges earlier phases of post-trial judicial review
over later phases, thereby requiring the earliest possible presentation of a claim and
avoiding duplication, especially of inquiries into the factual accuracy of the truth.
The American system does not altogether lack duplication; our federal system
gives federal claims, at least, a hearing both in state and federal courts, albeit a
federal hearing that is increasingly deferential to the state court decision. Aside
from that federalism-motivated caveat, one finds in the American system a
pronounced emphasis on finality – the avoidance of duplication – in criminal
adjudication.335
The Supreme Court has often emphasized society’s interest in the finality of
criminal convictions.336 In Herrera, the Court made the point thus:
Federal courts are not forums in which to relitigate state trials. The guilt
or innocence determination in state criminal trials is a decisive and
portentous event. Society’s resources have been concentrated at that time
and place in order to decide, within the limits of human fallibility, the
question of guilt or innocence of one of its citizens. Few rulings would be
more disruptive of our federal system than to provide for federal habeas
review of freestanding claims of actual innocence.337
With regard to the value of respect for human rights, we see many features
shared by the United States and Finland. To the extent that the right to appeal a
conviction is itself a human right, that right is now well-established in both
countries. Both countries appoint counsel to represent indigent persons on appeal.
Finland recognizes victims as having the status of parties in criminal cases and in
criminal appeals, and to that extent, the Finnish system manifests a broader vision
of human rights than does the American.338 On the other hand, the rule in the
United States barring prosecution appeals of acquittals reveals a particular
sensitivity to the predicament faced by an accused defendant, and a determination
not to prolong that predicament beyond an acquittal at trial. Otherwise, the precise
structure and content of appellate procedure does not very much implicate broader
concepts of human rights.
With regards to the last criterion—the goal of enhancing the public reputation
of the criminal adjudication system—one finds rather more to say. Here, perhaps,
we find the explanation for the privileged position of the jury in the American
334. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 426 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
335. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76
HARV. L. REV. 441, 452 (1963); Findley, supra note 55, at 607; Oldfather, supra note 49, at 494, 502.
336. E.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 179 (2001); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 401
(1993); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491-92 (1991); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989)
(plurality opinion); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90
(1977).
337. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 401 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
338. See Johnson, in TURUN YLIOPISTON OIKEUSTIETEELLINEN TIEDEKUNTA, supra note 324, for a
comparative discussion of the implications of the recognition of the party status of victims.
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system.339 Post-trial judicial review of criminal convictions in the United States
reflects the fact that, in the United States, the prestige and public reputation of the
system requires some substantial lay participation which professional judges,
however individually well qualified, cannot supply.
The explanation finds support in a long American tradition of suspicion of
expertise. In the years after American independence, some trial judges would
instruct jurors in terms explicitly hostile to expertise, as in the following New
Hampshire example:
They [the lawyers] talk of law. Why, gentlemen, it is not law we want,
but justice. They would govern us by the common law of England. Trust
me, gentlemen, Common sense is a much safer guide for us . . . . A clear
head and an honest heart are worth more than all the law of all the
lawyers.340
That tradition endures:
Americans are and have always been credulous sceptics. They question
the authority of priests, then talk to the dead; they second-guess their
cardiologists, then seek out quacks in the jungle. Like people in every
society, they do this in moments of crisis when things seem hopeless.
They also, unlike people in other societies, do it on the general principle
that expertise and authority are inherently suspect.341
In Finland, concerns about the possibility of venal corruption are unlikely to
influence the construction of the system of post-trial judicial review, as Finland
regularly ranks among the least corrupt societies on the planet.342 Equally
inapplicable, perhaps, is the concern that with expertise comes cynicism or
stereotypical thinking. In Finland, distrust for authority and expertise may be less
prevalent and faith in the wisdom of laymen less widespread.
We close then with an understanding of the Finnish system as relatively more
exclusively focused on achieving accurate results, even at some cost in terms of
efficiency. We see also a system relatively less dependent on the participation of
laypersons for its public legitimacy. In the United States, concerns about costs and
about legitimacy have greater influence over the system of post-trial judicial review
of convictions. Costs matter in the country that incarcerates a larger proportion of
its population than any other. By recent measures, the United States incarcerates
732 people per 100,000 population; Finland incarcerates 64 per 100,000.343
One might surmise that a system that so values efficiencies and public
confidence, to the extent even of compromising its pursuit of the goal of accuracy,
339. Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of
Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357 (1985).
340. LYNN WARREN TURNER, THE NINTH STATE: NEW HAMPSHIRE’S FORMATIVE YEARS 108
(1983).
341. Mark Lilla, The Tea Party Jacobins, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, vol. 57, No. 9, May 27, 2010, at 56.
342. See Finland Joint Second Least Corrupt Company, YLE (Dec. 1, 2011),
http://yle.fi/uutiset/news/2011/12/finland_joint_second_least_corrupt_country_3071537.html.
343. See LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATION IN THE
UNITED STATES, 2010 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus10.pdf; ROY
WALMSLEY, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUD., WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST (8TH EDITION) (2009),
available at http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/downloads/wppl-8th_41.pdf.
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does so because the system consumes enormous resources and because it does not
enjoy unquestioned public confidence.
Finland’s willingness to permit
reconsideration on appeal bespeaks a legal system not so overwhelmed by costs,
and not dependent, for public confidence, on the involvement of laypersons. Some
corroboration of those assessments would appear in the fact that Finland has been
reducing the role of lay judges, and does not operate a criminal justice system that
involves nearly so large a proportion of its population as the American system.
These conclusions must remain tentative. A comparison of other aspects of the
Finnish and American systems of criminal adjudication could substantiate, or call
into doubt, these hypotheses.344 Comparisons with the systems employed in other
countries would surely also enrich our understanding of the Finnish and American
systems. Much remains to be done before the premises, hidden assumptions, and
purposes of each country’s system of criminal procedure stand fully revealed.

344. A preliminary effort in that direction is made in Johnson, in TURUN YLIOPISTON
OIKEUSTIETEELLINEN TIEDEKUNTA, supra note 324.

